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INTRODUCTION
You think Wellington is a great general because youhave been beaten by him. I tell you Wellington is abad general
. .
Napoleon
18 June 1815
Napoleon uttered those words to his chief of staff,
Marshal Soult* on 18 June 1815, the morning of the battle
of Waterloo. Mellowed but never cowed after his defeat at
that battle. Napoleon eventually allowed that, as a field
commander, Wellington was probably his equal, ".
. .with
the advantage of having more prudence. Napoleon's later
comments attest to an historical truth, that Field-Marshal
the Duke of Wellington was an outstanding general, perhaps
Britain's greatest field captain.
At the time Napoleon Bonaparte faced the Duke of
Wellington at Waterloo, the duke was the best military
commander in the world. In full command of the time-proven
elements of military success, the field marshal was also an
innovator. He displayed an exceptional grasp of all aspects
of campaign. A master of strategy, operations, tactics and
logistics, he broke with the accepted norms of the
profession to propose fitness regimens for his soldiers, and
to pursue tirelessly the acquisition of supplies and
materiel required for the well-being of his troops. One of
*Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult.
Wellington's most unusually profitable qualities was his
ability to coalesce winning armies from polyglot formations
that operated under vastly differing systems and often spoke
many different languages. Further, he dealt with the twin
plagues of military operations, communication and
transportation, before he ever faced an enemy. The duke's
emphasis on protecting his soldiers by ensuring their
welfare coupled with his extensive preparations before
entering a conflict was the beginning of a British martial
renaissance that continued throughout the nineteenth
century. Soldiers will endure almost any hardship if their
commander cares about them and leads them to victory.
Wellington did just that, and inspired Captain John
Kincaid's comment: "We would rather see his long nose in a
fight than a reinforcement of ten thousand men any day."^
Of particular interest is the process of the duke's
military education. He was certainly a man of intellect and
keen insight, but commanders are made, not born. Like all
late eighteenth century officers, Wellington had to acquire
his expertise through study and experience. He applied
himself to that task in his typical fashion and excelled
beyond his colleagues to become a master of modern warfare.
He set himself apart from his brother officers by his
singular and total dedication to success.
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There is no question that Sir Arthur Wellesley*, the
Duke of Wellington, belongs to an exclusive cotillion of
military masters that stand apart from and above most
generals; a small pantheon peopled by the likes of
Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon. My purpose is not to
reiterate Wellington's exploits in order to glorify him.
That has already been done, many times, by many others. The
goal of this essay is to examine how the ".
. .quiet,
dejected and observant" boy of twelve, obsessed with his
violin, grew into the field marshal who defeated, most often
in the face of superior numbers, the vaunted Imperial French
army and, ultimately, Napoleon himself."
*Born Arthur Wesley, he became Wellesley when his older
brother, Richard, changed the family name to Wellesley in 1798.
Arthur was not created Viscount Wellington until after the battle
of Talavera in 1809.
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CHAPTER 1
TO COLONEL BY PURCHASE
Youth and Education
Arthur Wesley was born in Dublin on 1 May 1769.^ His
father, the second Lord Mornington, was an accomplished
musician but a poor financial manager. The passive and
unassuming youth took quickly to the music that his father
brought to the home and by age twelve Arthur showed real
promise on the violin. The Earl's early death in 1781 left
the family ".
. .financially embarrassed" and the future
duke without a patron for his musical endeavors.^
Arthur's mother, Lady Mornington, was much more
pragmatic than her late husband and also less than fond of
her middle son. According to one biographer. Sir Herbert
Maxwell: "It is believed that she disliked Arthur as a boy,
because of his slow, thick speech and dull manner, which
gave him an air of stupidity."^ With the help and approval
of Arthur's older brother, Richard, the Earl of Mornington,
Lady Mornington situated Arthur at Eton. While not
unsuccessful there, he showed no real promise and, as funds
were short and there were other more promising sons to
educate, she withdrew the future field marshal from Eton in
the summer of 1784, bemoaning Arthur's mediocrity and
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apparent lack of drive: "i don't know what I shall do with
my awkward son Arthur."*
As a youth, then, the future Duke of Wellington
displayed none of the qualities that would so distinguish
him in later life. Frustrated with her son's chronic
underachievement and worried about his prospects. Lady
Mornington complained that Arthur was ".
. .food for powder
and nothing more."^ Accordingly, his mother began to steer
him toward the military, though the least attractive of
possible careers, by enrolling him in the Royal Academy of
Equitation at Angers, in the present day department of
Maine-et-Loire, France. This preparatory institution, an
historic quasi-military school, continued the martial
traditions of old. In addition to equestrian and fencing
skills, the students also learned mathematics and
humanities.^ At the Royal Academy the young student gained
a working knowledge of French, a knowledge that would serve
the future general well during his years facing Napoleon's
armies. Further, Wesley developed socially from the almost
painfully shy, lonely and clumsy youth into an engaging and
dynamic young man. Moreover, pale and often sickly, at
Angers he seems to have developed a more robust
constitution. In short, he excelled. It was as though he had
finally found his niche. The weak and diminutive young boy
who had entered the academy at Angers left it in late 1786,
a robust seventeen year old brimming with confidence and
thoroughly steeped in the traditions of old Europe. When his
mother first saw him she said: "I do not believe there is
my ugly boy Arthur."^
Early Career
Britain's army officer corps has long been a repository
for the flotsam of the aristocracy, especially so in the
latter eighteenth century. In this era a career in the army
was a last resort for many of offspring of the high born.
Entrance and promotion in the infantry and cavalry, based
neither on merit nor seniority, depended on the candidate's
ability to purchase a desired position and was, of course,
subject to all manner of corruption. Only the Ordnance
branches, artillery and engineers, differed, requiring
formal education and promotion based solely on seniority.*
Arthur Wesley entered into this system in 1787 when he
acquired an ensign's commission in the 73rd Highland
Regiment, purchased on his behalf by his older brother
Richard.
One would think that upon assumption of a commission,
an officer would commence formal military training and
education. Such was not the case in eighteenth century
Britain: Sandhurst, the royal military academy for the
training of officers, was not founded until 1801. Arthur was
not, at first, particularly enamored of a military career
and thought of it as a stepping stone to some other form of
honorable employment. Yet he seemed determined to do well as
an officer. According to one story, upon receiving his
ensign's commission he remarked, ".
. .since I have
undertaken a profession I had better try to understand
it."^ To that end he purportedly had one of his privates
weighed, first without marching gear and then with full kit.
When, in later years, an observer complimented his foresight
Wellington replied:
I believe that I owe most of my success to the
attention I always paid to the inferior part of tactics
as a regimental officer. There were very few men in the
army who knew these details better than I did; it is
the foundation of all military knowledge. When you are
sure that you know the power of your tools and the way
to handle them, you are able to give your mind
altogether to the greater considerations which the
presence of the enemy forces on you.^°
Wesley's complicated promotion and transfer history
from his original date of commission, 7 March 1787, through
his lieutenant colonelcy, 30 September 1793, also seems to
reflect his determination to excel in his profession:
Date
7 March 1787
25 December 1787
23 January 1788
25 June 1789
30 June 1791
31 October 1792
30 April 1793
30 September 1793
Promotion History:
Regiment
73rd Foot
76th Foot
41st Foot
12th Lt Dragoons
58th Foot
18th Lt Dragoons
3 3rd Foot
33rd Foot
Rank
Ensign
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Lieutenant
Captain
Captain
Major
Lieut. Colonel
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Obviously he rose in rank relatively rapidly while
alternating between the cavalry and the infantry. His many
transfers would certainly stand him in good stead in the
future. Rarely could a junior officer claim the breadth of
exposure to both mounted and infantry units apparent in
Arthur's early years.
During those early years he served in mundane
assignments, most notably as aide-de-camp to Lord
Buckingham, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, from spring of
1788 to early 1794." Concurrent with his military service
in Ireland, Wesley also sat in the Irish Parliament as
member from the borough of Trim. Since he participated
actively as a member, his aide-de-camp duties did not seem
to overwhelm him. During his tenure in the Irish Parliament
he developed some public-speaking skills. According to one
anecdote, an observer asked the name of the young hook-nosed
member from Trim: "That," ''replied my friend,' "is Captain
Wellesley [sic], a brother of Lord Mornington's , and one of
the aides-de-camp of the Lord Lieutenant." "I suppose he
never speaks," ^I added.' "You are wrong; he does speak
sometimes, and when he does, believe me, it is always to the
purpose. "^^ It appears that Parliamentary public speaking
served as the training ground for the future duke's
legendary economy of speech.
Arthur rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the
33rd regiment in December, 1793, the unit he would lead to
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distinction in India, with that rank Arthur assumed command
of a battalion. By that time he seems to have changed his
plans about his future and decided that his destiny lay in a
military career. To that end he burned his violin, severing
with it most ties to his youth." with no formal
preparation for command, Wellesley found himself in charge
of almost 700 soldiers, and he steeled his resolve to attain
military competence. His resolve almost coincided with his
first taste of combat. In early 1794, Lieutenant Colonel
Wesley and the 33rd Foot were attached to a contingent under
Lord Francis Rawdon-Hastings
, Earl of Moira, assigned to
relieve the distressed forces of the Duke of York, trapped
by the French in Flanders. The Gallic forces had invaded the
Low Countries after diplomatic relations between the French
and British had ended, in 1793, in acrimonious declarations
of war. Britain was understandably concerned for her own
security with the hostile army of revolutionary France so
close at hand.'' Thus, without benefit of training in
strategy, tactics or the operational art, Arthur now would
lead a battalion of soldiers in harm's way.
The reinforcing contingent landed in Flanders in the
summer of 1794.^^ For the British army and its commander
in chief, the Duke of York, this campaign had failed in
every sense of the word. Outnumbered and cornered in the
hostile environs of Flanders, where Lord Moira had joined
it, the army had retreated ignomiously into Holland. There
the incipient genius of the lieutenant colonel of the 33rd
became obvious at an action at Boxtel. Wesley fought a
successful infantry action against charging French cavalry.
The disciplined and coordinated volley fire of the 33rd's
muskets turned the French horsemen back.- One can picture
Wesley's force, drawn up in line, holding fire until
commanded to do so, a tactic he would so often use with so
much success throughout his military career (though hardly
his innovation). Later, from October 1794 through January
1795, Wesley, by then a nominal brigade commander, led the
rearguard of the retreating debacle that the British army in
Flanders had become by that time. Essentially forgotten
along the banks of the river Waal, Wesley and his brigade
held their position until ordered to withdraw in February
1795.
Important to the development of the future field
marshal during these dark days of retreat was his witnessing
the conditions endured by his troops. Much of Arthur's later
success owed to his detailed consideration for the welfare
of the rank and file, and his extensive preparations before
a campaign to ensure that welfare. During the harsh winter
of 1794-1795, when the bulk of the British army had
retreated to winter quarters, Wesley's 33rd remained,
holding the rear under constant pressure. "The French," he
said, "keep us in a perpetual state of alarm, we turn out
once, sometimes twice, every night; the officers and men are
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harassed to death.
.
.i have not had the clothes off my back
for a long time and generally spend the greater part of the
night upon the bank of the river.— Army headquarters was
distant, inefficient and not too concerned with the
rearguard: "I was left there with my regiment.
. .thirty
miles from headquarters.
. .and I do not think I was ever
once visited by the Commander-in-Chief."^^ In 1839,
reminiscing with the Earl of Stanhope, Wellington damned
even more the command hierarchy in Flanders than he had
while serving there. Stanhope offered: "Your regiment, Sir,
was, I believe, left for a long while on the Waal without
any order or direction?" Wellington replied:
"Yes, the headquarters were twenty five miles
off. I was on the Waal, I think, from October to
January, and during all that time I only saw once one
general from the headquarters, which was old Sir David
Dundas.
.
.We had letters from England, and I
declare that those letters told us more of what was
passing at headquarters than we learned from the
headquarters themselves.
. .The real reason I succeeded
in my own campaigns is because I was always on the
spot - I saw everything and did everything for
myself
.
The British government recalled the Duke of York, as
author of the military failure, and installed General Count
Walmoden as his successor. ^° The Dutch campaigns of 1794-
1795 provided few British heroes. They did, however, give
Wesley his baptism of fire and exposed him to the
ineffective and incompetent command structure of his
country's military hierarchy and their ruinous policy of
neglecting the welfare of the common soldier. Arthur would
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never countenance, during his later commands, inadequate
food and shelter, poor communications, no intelligence
apparatus, inadequate transport and expending valuable and
limited resources transporting officers' baggage. His
Flanders service convinced Wesley that the regiments were
sound but that British military leadership was not up to the
task.^^
As an academy for a future field marshal the Dutch
campaign was invaluable. During it Wesley developed an
ability to lead large formations, indicative of innate
leadership abilities. Outnumbered at Boxtel
, he employed the
standard defense of volley fire but employed it so
effectively that he won the battle, one of the few bright
moments in an otherwise dismal campaign. That action and the
success of his rearguard along the river Waal testify to a
superior military mind. But the failures of the campaign
impressed him as well. Wesley said it best himself: "Why -
I learnt what one ought not to do, and that is always
something . "^^
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CHAPTER 2
APPRENTICESHIP IN INDIA
Destination: Trifiia
Arthur Wesley returned to Britain, with his tired but
largely unscathed regiment, in the early spring of 1795.^
The abortive expedition to the Low Countries must surely
have been a humbling experience, although the lieutenant
colonel gained some experience of real value during that
calamitous fiasco. With the burning of his violin, Arthur
had turned his back on his youth and applied himself
unsparingly to the profession that he now accepted as his
destiny. He saw his military service as a contribution to
the public good, an idea he held in high regard. He viewed
his entire career, after Holland, as selfless service to his
nation: he felt that he was ". . .retained for Life."^ He
had not merely endured his Dutch experience, he had "learnt
what one ought not to do." After Holland, Wesley was a
changed man, serious and dedicated. Many noticed the
transformation and remarked about the perception and
intellectual alacrity of the young veteran. William Pitt
(the Younger) assessed the lieutenant colonel favorably:
I have never met any military officer with whom it
is so satisfactory to converse. He states every
difficulty before he undertakes any service, but none
after he has undertaken it.^
Wesley reconstituted, refitted and rested the 33rd and
by September, 1795, had assembled it at Portsmouth. The
regiment was ordered to join Lieutenant General Sir Ralph
Abercromby's expedition to the West Indies.* This was not
the best of news, as service in the Caribbean colonies was
frequently lethal in the late eighteenth century,
particularly from disease. For example, of the approximately
400 officers who took part in the capture of Martinique in
1794, 197 died. Of that group, 27 were battle casualties
while the balance succumbed to various tropical diseases,
principally malaria.^ Nevertheless, Wesley and the 33rd
sailed in September only to be battered by a series of
storms that scattered the fleet and forced them to return to
the refuge of their home ports. The reorganized force
departed again in December. Two months later they were again
blown back to England to await the kinder weather of spring.
In the interim, however, the 33rd received new orders that
diverted them from Abercromby's force and detailed them for
duty in India.
Even though Wesley had looked forward to service with
Abercromby, the change in orders was an event of real
fortune for the future field marshal. The difference between
duty in the colonial Americas and the East Indies was, as
Lady Longford aptly phrased it, the difference between
entering "the white man's graveyard," and stepping "into
the treasure-house of the Orient."'' Additionally, Wesley,
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never of truly robust health, had suffered serious illness
from the constant exposure to the harsh Dutch winter of the
preceding year, 1794-95. Although he could not know it,
Arthur's future was certainly much brighter because of the
change in orders which gave him additional time to bolster
his physical status as well as providing a less virulent
destination. More importantly, India would be the classroom
for a field marshal that the Atlantic colonies could never
have been.
The reason for the 33rd's assignment to India was to
reinforce the forces of the East India Company against
possible (probable?) French activity there. As a result of
the War of the Austrian Succession and, subsequently, the
Seven Years War, France had lost much prestige and position
in India. Treaty provisions had allowed the French to
maintain small, unfortified trading ports but the French
military presence had been largely eradicated. The new
French republic had sharply repulsed the attack of the
European monarchies that followed the Reign of Terror of
1794 and was now fully prepared to flex her imperial muscles
again. Indeed, French activity in India, especially in
Mysore, had been increasing for several years. Perceiving
this threat, the East India Company requested reinforcement
from London which, in turn, dispatched Wesley and his
regiment, among others.
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colonel Wesley arrived at Fort William, in Calcutta,
the seat of the British governor general, in February 1797.
During the voyage Arthur had received word of his brevet
promotion to colonel. He had also become a student of India
and advanced military science. That is, when Arthur finally
accepted the military as a career (see page 7, above), he
did it thoroughly, immersing himself in the details of his
profession. He firmly believed that he could overcome the
professional indolence of his early years and, by his own
efforts, learn how to become a great commander. Before he
departed England he had purchased a considerable personal
library, not restricted to drill manuals. It included world
and Indian atlases, histories of India and British
adventures therein, primers on the languages of the
subcontinent as well as works by Adam Smith, Voltaire,
Rousseau and Frederick the Great.®
Physically rejuvenated and intellectually exercised
upon arrival. Colonel Wesley made a very fine impression on
Sir John Shore, the governor general: "If Colonel Wellesley
[sic] should ever have the opportunity to distinguish
himself, he will do it greatly."' After their meeting, and
at Sir John's insistence, the military planners at Fort
William included Wesley in a fledgling plan to attack
Manila. The East India Company was concerned that the
presence of the Spanish, a French ally, in the Philippines
constituted a threat to Company commerce and security and
had urged the attack on those grounds, it was clear that sir
John held Wesley in high regard; so much so that the colonel
believed that he would be named commander of the
expeditionary force: "since my last an expedition to
Manilla [sic] has been talked of, upon which I am to go, and
I believe to have command of the corps furnished by this
settlement."- This letter, like the rest of Wesley's
correspondence of spring, 1797, makes it clear that he was
an ambitious man, anxious to do great things. In the event,
the more senior Major General John St. Leger commanded the
expedition, which included the disappointed Wesley, when it
sailed in August 1797. The setback presaged what the colonel
would often face in the future in India, a buffeting among
the three forces of bureaucratic preference for his
services, military seniority technicalities and his own
belief that he could accomplish absolutely anything.'^
Once aboard the ships bound for Manila, Wesley
continued his now-established practice of looking after the
welfare of his troops, down to the smallest detail. Custom
dictated that, while aboard, the ship's naval officers would
have charge of the embarked soldiers. Freed of their
charges, the array officers could retire to their cabins to
endure the voyage as best they could. Wesley refused to
adhere to that custom, taking it upon himself instead to
attend to his regiment. Probably his position as a colonel
18
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in a regular British unit (as opposed to a unit of the East
India Company) as well as his favorable standing with Sir
John permitted this unorthodox abrogation of custom.- The
colonel particularly worried that the 33rd, trained to
precision during their five months ashore, would be
hopelessly out of condition when they reached Manila. For
twenty of the previous twenty-seven months they had traveled
as passengers on eighteenth-century British troop
transports."
Revolutionary, especially in the British army of 1797,
were Wesley's "Regimental Orders for on Board Ship"."
They reflected the commander of the 33rd's effort to occupy
his troops fully during the tedious voyage from Calcutta to
Manila by way of Penang, a settlement on the Malay
peninsula. The painstaking detail of the thirty-six dicta
addressed such areas as physical fitness regimens, sleeping
hours, guard duties, musketry practice and specific details
of personal hygiene and ventilation of living spaces.
Wesley mandated inspections and foul weather procedures, and
he firmly controlled the distribution of spirit rations. As
one would expect, when the 3 3rd disembarked during the
layover in Penang it was fit and ready to conduct
operations. To maintain that fitness the colonel did not let
his soldiers idle their time away ashore. On the contrary,
the 33rd began intensive parade and drill maneuvers to
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compensate for the United opportunities to do so on the
voyage.
The actions of this young regimental commander during
the voyage speak of an understanding and experience far
beyond his years. The officer who prepared the thirty-six
regimental orders of July 1797 was a demonstrably concerned
and caring leader, it behooves every officer to preserve the
fighting strength of his command but Wesley's style of
leadership was certainly not characteristic of the army
during this period. By his measures he brought much extra
work upon himself and likely, because his measures required
extra work for his regiment as well, provoked grumbling in
the ranks and among his officers. Yet the net result far
outweighed the cost because the 3 3rd was always healthy and
combat ready. The colonel who dictated the regimental orders
foreshadowed the field marshal who wrote his own rules
within the context of service to the public good.
Portent of Greatness
Disappointment at the failed prospect of command of the
Manila expedition was short-lived, because the governor
general recalled the force before it reached its
destination. At best of dubious conception, the expedition's
departure left the East India Company in a perilously weak
defensive state, especially in view of the newly-resurgent
French republic. Accordingly, while in Penang, the force
received orders to return and it arrived in Calcutta in
December 1797.
After situating his regiment in Bengal, with, of
course, specific drilling and training instructions. Colonel
Wesley, from January through March 1798, performed an
extensive reconnaissance of the battlefields of southern
India." He had studied India extensively during the
voyage from Britain.- He knew France and Britain had
fought with each other on the subcontinent throughout much
of the eighteenth century and that France was anxious to
renew her claims there. In anticipation that the conflict
might erupt again, he wished to see for himself the land he
might soon have to traverse with an army.
The colonel focused his reconnaissance efforts on the
Carnatic, Mysore and Hyderabad. Those south-central regions
were the most probable locales for any future Anglo-French
hostilities in India because of the ever-increasing French
presence in Mysore. Anti-British sentiment ran high in
Mysore as a result of General Cornwallis'* defeat of the
Sultanate of Mysore under Tipoo Sultan in 1791-92.^'' Tipoo
had not accepted his defeat and subsequent territorial
losses gracefully. He had not come to realize the benefits
*General Charles Cornwallis, second Earl and first
Marquis Cornwallis.
of British suzerainty. Patiently biding his time before
seeking revenge, he brought into his army French armaments
and officers.- By 1798 he possessed a formidable and
hostile force officered in many cases by French
professionals."
Because of the potential volatility in Mysore, Wesley
spent the preponderance of his reconnaissance there. British
military endeavors in that region, while on the whole
successful, had also seen reverses, notably the destruction
of Colonel William Baillie's force of some 4,000 troops on
10 September 1780.- Wesley resolved to avoid repeating
past errors. To that end he traced Cornwallis' successful
march on Seringapatam, Tipoo's capital. =^
Colonel Wesley made two significant determinations
during his sojourn. First, he found that the established
passes through the mountains to reach the tableland of
Mysore, those most commonly traveled and that Cornwallis had
used, were covered by potentially hostile fortifications.
The colonel then discovered many other smaller, but
nevertheless passable, secondary routes through the
mountains which troops and cavalry could use. Cornwallis,
without the luxury of advanced inspection of the area of
operations, had not been aware of them, or if he had, had
chosen to ignore them. Wesley would not.
Colonel Wesley also determined that considerable
advantage would go to the British if their armies could
nd
assei^ble and move through the Baramahal with impunity.
Transit through Baramahal, an area between the Carnatic a
Mysore, was unavoidable to any force bent on Seringapatam.
The security of that region would eliminate the constant
threat to the supply lines that had caused General
Cornwallis to establish Bangalore as a satellite logistical
base. Arthur believed that the quiescence of Baramahal,
preferably by cooperation but forcibly if necessary, was
essential to the success of any operation against the
Mysorean capital."
Wesley's analysis, offering no more than one would
expect of any competent staff officer today, was remarkable
for its time. His very presence in Mysore indicated a keen
analytical mind at work, the planning of a brilliant officer
for future contingencies. He examined, in minute detail, the
routes, terrain, forage and water supplies of the area. No
one else, not even one of the several senior generals, had
performed a similar reconnaissance or directed that one be
completed. Of the future duke's penchant for tireless
preparation. Colonel G.F. Henderson, a noted historian of
the British army, wrote: "Do we always remember that it was
by hard work, in peace as well as in war, by devotion to
duty in its highest sense, by doing whatsoever his hand
found to do with all his might. . .[that he distinguished
himself ]
.
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Preparation nnri pjrst Anl-i on
A ship sailing up the Hooglie to Fort William, in
Calcutta, in the spring of 1798 brought with it an important
agent of imperial expansion in India, Arthur's older
brother, Richard. The Earl of Mornington became the
Governor-General of India in April.- Arthur had
previously urged his brother to come to India, wishing to
see him in the position of governor general. In July of 1797
he had reminded Richard of a previous letter that had asked
him to "Look to the Government of this Country." The
colonel had continued:
I am glad to find that there is so near a
prospect of my wishes upon that subject being
accomplished. I am convinced that you will retain yourhealth; nay, it is possible that its general state may
be mended; and you will have the fairest opportunities
of rendering material services to the public, and of
doing yourself credit, which, exclusive of other
personal considerations should induce you to come
out.=^
Now Mornington had come, bringing with him new direction
for the British in India, and a new name as well, Wellesley,
an older version of the family name. Mornington had
resurrected it for some rather convoluted personal
reasons.^* Arthur cooperated with Richard's titular
eccentricities and adopted the name. His first
correspondence with Wellesley as his signature is in a
letter of 19 May 1798, to S.R. Lushington, secretary to
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Lieutenant General George Harris, the Commander in Chief and
acting Governor of Fort George, the seat of the Madras
presidency .^^
Mornington's goals were more ambitiously imperialist
than those of his predecessors. As historian Jac Weller
wrote: "Mornington may have come out with a master plan for
expansion in the back of his mind."- A new breed of
colonialist, Richard, like Arthur, believed public service a
noble vocation, especially in a colony like India. He also
believed it his duty to improve the lot of the Indians by
instituting British administrative and government
structures. Mornington (and Colonel Wellesley) thought that
the Indians could only thrive under British rule, and he
hoped to expand the boundaries of that rule.
An increased French presence in Mysore blocked that
expansion. The Europe that the earl had just left was rife
with French victories as the new republic had lashed out at
the old monarchies that had tried to forcibly maintain the
status quo of the Ancien Regime. In the ascendant, the
armies of the republic, and their emerging genius, Napoleon,
were the single strongest military power of continental
Europe, a formidable instrument of the expansion-minded
republic. France was reasserting a military presence in
India and Tipoo's recent agreement with the French governor
at Mauritius posed a serious threat to Mornington's plans.
Tipoo's open hostility to the British made settlement, at
least on British terms, impossible. The earl entered into
pro forma negotiations with Tipoo in 1798 only in order to
buy time while he cemented alliances and built up forces for
an attack on Mysore. The most important alliance would be
with Hyderabad. It derived its political and strategic
importance from its proximity to Mysore and from its large
army which, like that of Mysore, was French-led.-
Politically hostile because of years of poor treatment by
the East India Company, the Nizam of Hyderabad preferred an
alliance with the French.- Mornington's diplomatic
maneuvers, called brilliant by some, resulted in the nizam
coming instead to an accord with the British. A treaty
between the Company and the nizam, signed on 1 September
1798, called for all French officers to be replaced by East
India Company officers.^^ Furthermore, thnizam agreed not
only to enter into an accord with the British but also to
ally with them against Tipoo.
Throughout the summer and autumn of that year, the
Company concentrated ever greater numbers of troops in
Madras. Colonel Wellesley and his regiment formed part of
that buildup. The regiment embarked aboard the Fitz-William
,
in August. On the way from Calcutta to Madras the ship
struck a reef and almost foundered. Fluky winds also delayed
its progress so that the voyage required over three weeks.
Worse, the drinking water aboard was contaminated, further
shaking Wellesley's already poor opinion of military
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dprovisioners. Most of the 33rd experienced some level of
illness, generally dysentery, but several soldiers died.
Wellesley thought it "very inconsistent with the principles
of the Christian religion to give people bad water when
[Captain Frazer] had notice of the probability that it woul
be so."" In spite of those difficulties, the 33rd arrived
in Madras and Wellesley led his men from there to Vellore,
the city on the Baramahal border that was the main staging
area for the grouped battalions.
By the end of December 1798, a considerable force had
assembled in and around Madras. When Arthur arrived, he
contributed significantly to planning the move against
Mysore. His experience gained during his reconnaissance and
his reputation for tactical thought made him a valued
contributor. The plan that finally emerged called for a two-
pronged attack. General Harris would march against the
Sultanate from the east while Lieutenant General James
Stuart would come down from Bombay and strike from the west.
The planners intended the forces to converge simultaneously
on Seringapatam, Tipoo's capital and main citadel.
At this point someone else's tragedy turned into
Wellesley 's good fortune. Colonel Henry Harvey Ashton, the
commander of the brigade of which Wellesley's 33rd formed a
part, was killed in a duel in mid-December.^" Wellesley
and Ashton had worked together for months preparing the
plans for the Mysore campaign and had held each other in
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mutual high regard. The survivor deeply regretted his
superior's death. Honored to receive Ashton's fine Arabian
stallion, Diomed, as a bequeathal, Wellesley also took over
the brigade." "i have taken comnand of the troops.'-, he
noted on 20 December.^*
As acting brigadier and the senior commander present
(General Harris and his principal subordinate commanders had
remained in Madras), Wellesley began organizing the mass of
troops at Vellore. The task of assigning bivouac areas,
guard responsibilities, and similar issues, was relatively
easy to accomplish. Overcoming the logistical problems,
however, presented much more of a challenge. The necessity
of acquiring sufficient victuals, forage, supply and
transport, long the bane of armies, had bedeviled Cornwallis
during the campaign of 1791.^^ They now promised to make
the campaign of 1799 a nightmare. Until relatively recently,
most generals disdained the unglamorous world of logistics
as not the business of officers and gentlemen. Wellesley was
not like most generals. Always concerned for the welfare of
his soldiers, at Vellore he would show how innovation and
desire could overcome many of the problems imposed by
logistical limitations. Obviously a mere colonel could not
remake the army establishment or create an efficient
commissary corps. He could, however, assess the problem and,
with the benefit of his preparation, find a solution to it.
Wellesley's knowledge of the history of British armies in
India and his recollection of the entrepreneurial nature of
the merchants in the bazaars of Madras helped him greatly.
Cornwallis had used the bri;.jarries
, wholesale grain
merchants, to transport rice for his force during his second
march on Seringapatam in 1792." Wellesley adopted that
novel approach but modified it slightly in that instead of
using the bri^jarries as bearers of rice as Cornwallis had,
he used them as purveyors, merchants of rice. This gave the
brinjarries a vested interest in maintaining the security of
the rice because they had a financial stake in it. Further,
Wellesley lured groups of merchants and craftsmen from the
bazaars of the cities to accompany the expeditionary force.
This second group provided the army and the camp followers
with goods and services of every description. Finally,
Wellesley started a process of gradually hiring transport
services, especially transport by bullocks, as they were the
most adaptable to overland campaigns.^' His preparations
were thorough and complete. They also proved advantageous to
the campaign because the brinjarries and bazaars, while
adding to the mass that had to move cross country, cost the
East India Company nothing. Not only did the merchants have
a financial interest in the efficient and honest conduct of
commerce but the bazaar merchants also provided services
unheard of in a travelling army. As one Wellington scholar
observed
:
If and when the army advanced west, these bazaars
would go too and at their own expense and
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responsibility This system of merchandising was as oldas the East and more efficient than it seems to An
^?ce"oth^'''
contained merchants who c^^ld supply*
craftsmen caDablfo?'^ ""^^^^"^ ^^^^ ^^er^ were
coin o^^o^^ °^ making a soup tureen from silver
fn^nJf ^^P^^^i'^g a fine pistol by adding a newlyorged mainspring . ''° c x
colonel Wellesley's preparations during his two months as
senior commander in Vellore put the army on a sound
logistical footing.
General Harris, well pleased with the young brigade
commander, told Mornington about Arthur's "masterly
arrangements in respect to supplies."- At the same time
Harris assured Arthur's brother that he would like to praise
Wellesley publicly (usually accomplished via published
general orders) for his achievements at Vellore but was
concerned that if he did so others might become
.
.displeased and jealous. "*= Wellesley, himself, grew
angry at General Harris' reticence. He felt that his
position and achievement deserved public recognition, that
he had done more than merely exploit advantages provided by
his brother, the governor general. Prudently, the young
colonel kept his anger in check except for a minor outburst
in a letter to Richard:
The General expressed his approbation of what I
had done, and adopted as his own all the orders and
regulations I had made, and then said that he should
mention his approbation publicly, only that he was
afraid others would be displeased and jealous. One of
these others. General Floyd,* had been in a similar
situation with mine, but his army was starving: he had
Major General James Floyd
VeUore'^^^nfZ''^"* ^^^'^^ Madras,
camp? ' latterly by me from my own
As in fact there is nothing to be qot from thearmy but credit, and as it is not always the best
i? Ts i°"H to serve the public succeed,
receLp
when they do succeed they should not
th^v
approbation which it is acknowledged by alley deserve. I was much hurt about it at the^ime! but
Lt^^^l, t ^^^^^ certainly continue to doeverything to serve General Harris, and support hisname and authority . fh^-l ^
By late January 1799, the "unappreciative" Harris
commanded a force of 32,000.- Half of it, however, was
the nizam's army, which needed a firm but diplomatic
liaison/leader if it was to operate in concert with the
British. Colonel Ashton had earlier filled that role,
combining the finesse needed to manage the personalities of
another man's army with the necessity for solid, dependable
service."^ Now the duty fell to Wellesley, which
occasioned an uproar of protest from more senior officers
who believed themselves better qualified than the governor
general's brother. Their discovery that Meer Allum, the
nizam's son and field commander, had personally requested
Wellesley, however, muted the protest.**
On 3 February 1799, Harris' huge force, made all the
larger by the camp following that included the brinjarries
and the bazaars, began its westward movement. The "ponderous
machine" carried with it most of the victuals required for
human consumption even though it depended upon the
countryside to provide the forage for its 15,000 horses and
over 100,000 bullocks.- it would obviously take a
considerable supply of forage to sustain that many animals
on the march to Seringapatam. Tipoo, of course, realized
this British weakness. He had seen it before and learned
from it. The sultan tried to destroy anything that could
sustain the British in their march. He managed to lay waste
only the countryside along the probable route of march,
however, because he lacked the manpower to cover all the
other routes into Mysore. This was the benefit Wellesley had
foreseen in the control of Baramahal. Harris, by a series of
radical and unpredictable turns, abandoned the shortest
route, which Tipoo had rendered untenable, and moved his
army through unspoiled land. Between Harris' maneuvers and
Wellesley's grain (rice) stockage measures the force moved
steadily, albeit circuitously
, toward Seringapatam, as
February gave way to March.
Wellesley first skirmished with Tipoo's troops on 10
March. As General Harris moved deeper into Mysore, enemy
cavalry grew increasingly bold in harassing the British
columns. On the 10th, Wellesley's advance guard encountered
a column of 2,000 enemy cavalry. The acting brigadier sent
forward two 6-pounders with the pickets. The grape from
these field pieces rent huge holes in the Mysorean cavalry.
Wellesley then led a cavalry charge that dispersed the
remainder of the enemy column. In this first action his
force suffered 57 casualties to Tipoo's 500 or so.*"
Harris' force continued to creep forward without
meeting any significant opposition. But when on 26 March it
entered an open plain six miles east of the settlement of
Malavelley, it confronted a massive concentration of Tipoo's
troops and artillery. Harris made camp and prepared to
engage the sultan. Early the next morning the British force
moved toward the enemy. Tipoo's artillery began firing.
Harris, anxious to close with his foe, urged his men on. His
main army was positioned on the right, Wellesley and the
nizam's army on the left. He then ordered his acting
brigadier to attack Tipoo's right and try to turn that
flank. As the British columns struggled forward Tipoo sent
an infantry column of between 2,000 and 3,000 to check the
advance. ^° Now Tipoo would test the value of Wellesley's
six years of drill and practice with the 33rd. Arthur
ordered his regiment, the lead unit of the nizam's army, to
move from column to line as they approached a low ridgeline.
It executed the maneuver flawlessly, moving obliquely across
the crest of the ridge until the men presented two long
ranks of approximately 350 infantrymen each to the
approaching enemy. The Company units that marched behind the
33rd duplicated the maneuver, falling in behind the
redcoats. Tipoo's force, still in column, continued to close
with the British, now stationary in line. The regulars
watched their enemy approach until, at 60 yards Wellesley
commanded: "Thirty-third, make ready! Fire!"^^ The volley
34
Of 700 British muskets shattered the leading Mysorean
columns. The troops behind them could not continue the
advance because the bodies of those killed by British volley
fire impeded their forward progress. The 33rd, however,
rose, presented bayonets and marched forward with the steady
precision of the parade ground. The awesome spectacle of
unbroken ranks of regulars coming straight at them with cold
steel proved too much for the Mysoreans. They broke and ran.
Malavelley lives prominently in only two histories: one
by General Harris and one by Wellesley. For General Harris
it foreshadowed the successful outcome of a distinguished
career. For Wellesley it was his first real battle, and, as
it turned out, a defensive one. Wellesley's 700 musketeers
faced and repulsed a force at least three times their
number. To do so, their commander used the double-rank line
formation utilizing disciplined and effective volley fire.
The future field marshal seems to have possessed an instinct
for brilliant defense, as Malavelley had just shown, and as
the later efforts in Iberia would demonstrate. His defensive
maneuver, however, did not accord with the preferred British
tactic in India, the raid, a violent and unexpected attack,
almost always against a foe with superior numbers." This
tactic kept the Indian armies of the various princes,
usually larger than those of the Company, from being
concentrated and ready. The action could happen at any time
and from almost any direction, necessitating the dispersal
of princely forces and effectively neutralizing their
numerical superiority.
Wellesley had studied the tactics of the earlier
campaigners and was familiar with these audacious attacks
that seemed to work so well. He had observed that, once the
raids disrupted the enemy, the British and Company troops
usually carried the battle, inferiority of numbers
notwithstanding, as a result of their martial ferocity. The
lesson, for him then, was to capitalize on the disruption
caused by the raid by establishing a defensive line. He
demonstrated this hybrid of the raid at Malavelley. Usually
the British had rushed toward the enemy in column, then
waited until the enemy deployed before the redcoats formed
line. Then, three files deep, they used volley musket fire
and cannon to destroy the enemy formations.
Wellesley, however, deployed in line and awaited the
enemy still coming forward in column, and chose to form two
lines instead of three. The conventional wisdom of the later
eighteenth century, in the armies of Great Britain, France
and Prussia, dictated line formations with three ranks or
files. Two basic arguments favored the three-deep
formation. First, generals feared that in the heat of
battle, the first rank would suffer so many casualties that
the second rank, standing alone, could not provide a
sufficient volume of fire. Second, if the first rank was
depleted too much, it would not be able to form an effective
nee
square, the only sound defense against cavalry attacks si
no horse would charge a sea of bayonets. Wellington had
ignored the conventional wisdom because he had discovered
that the British in India did not usually encounter the
massive volumes of fire that they would face in Europe.
Also, Wellesley's 33rd was an exceptionally well-led and
disciplined unit. The best way to take care of your troops,
he believed, was to prepare them properly for battle.
Wellesley's exacting training regimen proved its worth at
Malavelley. The 33rd delivered three to four rounds per
minute against an enemy incapable of answering it.^^ As a
result, he never needed to worry about forming square
against a cavalry charge that never took place.
Malavelley is not listed in the regimental honors of
the 3 3rd, but perhaps it should be. It was the place where
the future Duke of Wellington applied his self-taught
tactics, training and discipline to excellent effect. While
he had been shot at in anger, he had never before led troops
in battle save for the defensive rearguard action at Boxtel
five years earlier. After Malavelley, Arthur could boast of
having commanded 16,000 men in combat. Certainly it requires
great skill to manage that number of soldiers, who spoke
several different languages, in the chaos of battle with
only the most rudimentary communication system. As a portent
of future coalition generalship and coolness in combat, this
action established the famous Wellington modus operandi
.
A Sobering Rf^vprc^^i
Tipoo fell back to his fortified capital in the first
days of April following the setback at Malavelley. General
Harris' army plodded after him and, on 4 April 1799, made
camp two miles south of Seringapatam.- Now they prepared
to assault it. Wellesley had helped formulate the British
plan of attack, it intended that the armies, which
approached from the east, would bypass the city to the south
and assemble in a fortified camp to the west. General
Stuart's force, approaching from the west would continue
straight toward the citadel and camp on the north bank of
the Cauvery River (see map
,
page 39). Colonel Wellesley
would situate the Nizam's army to the south and assume
responsibility for pickets to the south and east. From these
three camps the British would move against the city. They
would not besiege it in the formal sense of the word, but
would batter the walls and gates and follow with a rapid
attack combining assault and escalade. Sieges in India were
frequently of short duration because the brittle walls of
the fortresses usually succumbed quickly to the heavy shot
of the British siege guns, few as they might number.
Tipoo, anticipating Harris' plan, erected partial
fortifications between the fortress and an aqueduct that
meandered north toward the Cauvery and then south. Harris
needed to clear the area, all the way to the South Cauvery
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River, before he could assault the city. The British general
planned to take the area up to the aqueduct first, and
afterwards the zone between the aqueduct and the Little
Cauvery. Because he lay closest to it, Wellesley had the job
of clearing the Sultanpettah tope, a thicket of cocoa,
bainboo and betel. Harris wanted this grove taken because it
supposedly "had parties of men with arms assembling on
it."- Concurrent with Wellesley's activity, a party
would move out from the Harris camp to secure the northern
end of the aqueduct. Both assaults would take place after
dark
.
Wellesley did not like the situation. He would have to
approach a thicket which probably concealed a large force
without having first reconnoitered it and without benefit of
any intelligence concerning its strength. He recommended as
an alternative, taking the ends of the aqueduct and pinching
off the tope:
Upon looking at the Tope as I came in just now, it
appears to me that when you get possession of the bank
of the Nullah [watercourse of the aqueduct], you have
the Tope as a matter of course, as the latter is in the
rear of the former. However, you are the best judge,
and I will be ready. ^®
Wellesley's last statement, indicative of an obedient
subordinate, sealed his fate. General Harris ordered the
attack and, against his better judgment, Wellesley complied
with the order.
As darkness settled in, Wellesley's force, with the
3 3rd in the van, moved forward over the elevated
Seringapatam
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watercourse. The appearance of the redcoats startled the
Indian pickets who hurried back into the tope. Then its
defenders began showering their attackers with rockets,
which they would continue to do sporadically throughout the
inky black night. The darkness, the rocket attack, and the
thick jungle confused the British who groped forward without
knowing where they were or where the enemy awaited them. In
the confusion, Wellesley lost touch with his units. Soon,
discipline broke and, in disarray, the redcoats retreated
piecemeal from the tope. Wellesley related the incident to
his brother thus:
On the night of the 5th we made an attack upon the
enemy's outposts, which, at least on my side, was not
quite so successful as could have been wished. The fact
was that the night was very dark, that the enemy
expected us, and were strongly posted in an almost
impenetrable jungle. We lost an officer killed, and
others and some men wounded (of the 33rd); and at last,
as I could not find out the post which it was desirable
I should occupy, I was obliged to desist from the
attack, the enemy also having retired from the post.^'
A visibly-upset Wellesley returned to General Harris'
headquarters about midnight after he had done everything
possible to recover his dead and wounded. Harris heard him
out and noted later in his diary that the failure of the
33rd must have been "particularly unpleasant" for its
colonel
During this unfortunate affair, Wellesley had suffered
13 dead and eight men taken prisoner by the Mysoreans. The
bodies of the prisoners were later found. They had been
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tortured and killed, some by having nails driven through
their Skulls.- Wellesley must have been shocked at this
reversal. He knew every one of the 680 men in his regiment
by name. He took full responsibility for the casualties, the
prisoners and the failure. He wrote to the brother of a
lieutenant killed in the bungled assault:
I can offer you no consolation upon this
melancholy occasion. To inform you that your brotherdistinguished himself in the affair in which he losthis life; that in others, in which I have seen him
engaged during this war, he had conducted himself to mysatisfaction; that as an officer I had always, andparticularly that I had latterly, reason to be pleased
with him; will only add to the grief with which you andyour family must naturally be affected. 62
The next day another unit took the tope. The city
Itself fell a month later, on 4 May. Wellesley came away
from the affair sobered but not defeated. He resolved not to
commit the same error again. "I have come to a
determination," he said on 18 April, 1799, "when in my
power, never to suffer an attack to be made by night upon an
enemy who is prepared and strongly posted, and whose posts
have not been reconnoitered by daylight. "^^ Arthur would
engage in few night actions thereafter. He would also be
sure never to lose touch with his command, to let it wander
aimlessly, as had happened at the tope. He had learned
another valuable lesson, at a cost of 21 casualties.
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Assaye
The fall of Seringapatam brought the Mysore campaign
to a successful conclusion. After the city fell, Wellesley
became governor of it and, shortly afterward, of the whole
of Mysore.- During his tenure, he conducted a series of
offensive operations against minor potentates which
maintained peace in the interest of uninterrupted commerce:
against Dhoondia Waugh, June through September 1800; the
Rajah of Bullum, January and February 1802; actions to quell
the rebellions in Wynaad, 1802; the Peshwa Campaign and the
Mahratta War, February 1803 through June 1804.
This series of campaigns fully matured Wellesley as a
brigade and division commander. The longer he remained in
charge the more mobile and audacious his expeditions became.
Although he did not enjoy the luxury of numerical
superiority, he was never again repulsed as he had been at
the Sultanpettah tope (he assiduously avoided
unreconnoitered night actions).
The last of his operations against the Mahrattas in the
Mahratta War offered him the chance to display to the
fullest, his tactical genius in battle. His greatest victory
came at Assaye, a battle of offensive maneuver, wherein the
British, after a long day of marching, encountered a strong,
stationary enemy force that far outnumbered the redcoats.
The Mahrattas were, after the destruction of Tipoo's
sultanate, the most powerful group in India." Jealous of
British success in Mysore, and the subsequent East India
company presence there, they began to feel themselves
threatened. Unlike the Mysoreans, the Mahrattas were not
united, although they shared a common dislike for the
British. That dislike spawned a concomitant interest in
securing French military assistance. When the leaders of the
various Mahratta groups appealed to the French government
for aid, the British believed they had to nip this threat to
British suzerainty in the bud. The Mahratta war began.
Wellesley, now a major general, led an army of two
divisions through the Mahratta territory from August through
December 1803.- He commanded one of the divisions himself
and entrusted the other to Lieutenant Colonel James
Stevenson. Stevenson, a favored subordinate of long
standing, was familiar with the Wellesley methods of
operation. Throughout the spring and summer of 1803 the two
division commanders had worked well, operating in parallel,
and had enjoyed much success. On 21 September the two met at
Budnapoor to consider future plans.
Their chief opponent, a Mahratta leader, Scindia, whom
they believed encamped to their north near Borkardan,
commanded a formidable array. His regular infantry, led by
Europeans, probably numbered about 15,000.^'' He also had
some 10,000 to 20,000 additional infantry, but these men
were not officered by professionals and were less reliable
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as soldiers than were the regulars. Scindia's cavalry
numbered between 30,000 and 60,000. But since he
concentrated on developing an infantry force he had
neglected training his cavalry. Their numbers were
impressive, but not their martial skills, in addition to
this mass of at least 55,000 troops, Scindia also had a
powerful, mobile field artillery detachment."
After meeting at Budnapoor, General Wellesley and
Colonel Stevenson decided to split their force, a seemingly
curious move. Since Wellesley 's division probably numbered
no more than 7,000 and Stevenson's was smaller still, they
would defy the time-honored convention of never splitting
one's force in the face of an enemy superior in numbers."
A few months later Wellesley explained the reasoning behind
the separation:
We were desirous to engage the enemy at
the same time, and settled on a plan accordingly for an
attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the
22nd, he to march by the western, and I by the eastern
road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jalna: and
I have to observe that this separation was necessary,
-first, because both corps could not pass through the
same defiles in one day; secondly, because it was to
be apprehended, that if we left open one of the roads
through the hills, the enemy might have passed to the
southward, while we were going northward, and then
the action would have been delayed, or probably
avoided altogether . '°
Wellesley might not have separated his force, however,
had he not possessed full confidence in his intelligence
system which "reported the enemy to be at Borkerdun," and
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in the reliable, albeit oftentiimes overly cautious Colonel
Stevenson, 71
Approaches to Assaye
On the afternoon of 23 September, at Naulniah, the
general discovered that he had approached the enemy's
pickets. The Mahratta chief was not at Borkardan at all, but
at Assaye! This news came as a shock. Wellesley had taken a
chance and divided his force, and now he had encountered a
vastly superior enemy while at only half strength. Should he
wait for Stevenson in order to face Scindia at full strength
or should he seize the moment and attack the enemy? The
major general rode out to reconnoiter the area and
determined that the Mahrattas seemed certainly as surprised
as he. Evidently they had not expected his approach and had
no idea of his intentions. Now they were hastily breaking
camp and trying to form in an effort to repulse the British.
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wellesley decided quickly to attack without waiting for
Stevenson. He had an opportunity to catch Scindia off guard
which might never happen again. "i therefore," he later
commented, "determined to make the attack."- Wellesley
was sure that surprise would negate numerical superiority.
How should he attack? Scindia had chosen his position
well. To his immediate north, on the Juah River, a tributary
of the Kaitna River, stood the fortress of Assaye. Of mud
and masonry construction, the fort could not support
artillery on its ramparts. But Scindia had ringed it with
artillery, rendering it very dangerous indeed to any
attacker. He had deployed his regular units in tandem, with
his other infantry, along the banks of the Kaitna, south and
west of Assaye. This stream had banks so steep no carriages
could cross except at its fords. The Mahratta cavalry he had
stationed far to his right, or west, in a position that
would allow them to envelop a stalled foe or pursue a
fleeing enemy. The river and the fortress together provided
Scindia with an excellent defensive position. Wellesley's
Indian informants, furthermore, insisted that the only
viable fords over the Kaitna were at Kodully and Taunklee,
both to the immediate front of Scindia 's position and well
within the range of the withering fire of the Mahratta
artillery.
Riding along the Kaitna from west to east, in sight of
the enemy force, Wellesley continued his reconnaissance. As
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a result of this inspection he believed he now had found a
third ford, unguarded by the Mahrattas, connecting the
village of Peepulgaon on the south bank to that of Waroor on
the north. Waroor lay to the left, or west, of where the
Juah joined the Kaitna, and to the right, or east, of
Scindia's prepared positions. The general's hicarrahs,
brahmins he used as guides and spies, denied any such ford
existed.- Despite their protests, "I immediately said to
myself," Wellesley later recalled, "that men could not have
built two villages so close to one another
. . . without
some habitual means of communication."^* He therefore
decided to move across the ford he thought had to exist and
hit the enemy in the left flank and rear.- Once across,
although outnumbered at least eight to one, he could cause
Scindia to abandon his prepared positions. The Mahratta
leader would have to shift his entire force to his left to
face Wellesley's attack from the east. Surprised, and
crowded between the river and the fort, the Mahrattas might
not even be able to pivot to meet the British, in which case
Wellesley could roll up the enemy flank. The success of the
entire plan, however, rested upon the existence of a ford
his best intelligence denied existed. When asked, much, much
later why he would wager so much on a hope rather than a
certainty, the now duke replied: "That is common sense. And
when one is strongly intent on an object, common sense will
usually direct one to the right means. """^
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common sense, and his own reconnaissance in this
instance, brought him to the right means, for the ford lay
exactly where he had thought that it should. Enduring an
intense Mahratta artillery barrage, the redcoats crossed the
Kaitna with their own guns. Most of Wellesley's cavalry,
however, only 800 in number under the command of Lieutenant
Colonel Patrick Maxwell, remained drawn up in line on the
south bank of the Kaitna. Strange as it may seem, these 800
so intimidated the 30,000 to 60,000 Mahratta cavalry that
they failed to move to support their infantry. Wellesley had
anticipated that result, but the supposition was a risky
one. The British horse by their presence not only denied
Scindia half his force, they also shielded the first part of
the infantry crossing the river from the Mahrattas."
Wellesley only ordered Maxwell across after the infantry
began to assemble on the north bank, leaving a small
contingent of horsemen in place to cover the southern bank.
Once on the north side of the Kaitna, the British
infantry drew up in line, again in the two files Wellesley
favored. The recently-arrived cavalry formed a separate
third line, available to shore up any weakness or exploit an
opportunity. When completely formed, the redcoat line
stretched from the banks of the Kaitna, up the narrow tongue
of land formed by the confluence of the Juah and Kaitna, to
the banks of the Juah. Wellesley's army now stood in line,
about a mile long, facing west with both flanks protected by
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the rivers. Their looming presence necessarily forced the
Mahrattas to scramble out of their secure, prepared
positions along the Kaitna and reform in a new line facing
east to meet their foes. They managed to do so quickly
(thanks to their European officers) if inelegantly,
anchoring their left at Assaye to the north and their right
on the Kaitna to the south. The Mahratta artillery commenced
a voluminous, deadly barrage that began to tear holes in the
thin British lines. Wellesley had fooled his enemy and
forced him to move out of almost impregnable defenses into a
hasty, unanticipated formation. But the British general was
still vastly outnumbered and outgunned. He now had to either
attack or risk slaughter in place.
He attacked. He pushed his center and left forward
against the enemy, hoping to force them back and up from the
Kaitna to the Juah, at which time he believed Assaye would
give up. He did not want his right, however, to attack the
fort. Its cannon could rip to pieces any assaulting units.
All the British right needed to do was hold its position
until the center and left had pushed Scindia back to the
Juah. Then they could accept the fort's surrender. Wellesley
recognized the potential for disaster should his right come
under fire from Assaye. To prevent that eventuality he
conferred with Lieutenant Colonel William Orrock, the
commander of the unit farthest to the right of the British
line, and proscribed any movement to the north. Wellesley
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told colonel orrock "to keep out of shot from that
village.
. .
. The British commander then ordered the
advance. The disciplined Company forces moved forward
steadily under what Wellesley called "a very hot fire from
cannon, the execution of which was terrible. "^^ He
personally led the 78th Foot who would attempt to oust the
enemy from their key position along the Kaitna as they
"advanced rapidly and in good order. The battle that
followed grew ferocious and deadly. The Mahratta infantry
held on grimly until the British overran their artillery.
Only then did they begin to give way. But retreat they did,
and the Company seemed on the verge of total victory. in
the north, however, the pickets and the 74th infantry had
stumbled to the right into the withering fire of Assaye , a
situation Wellesley had from the first dreaded and which he
had tried to prevent." Colonel Maxwell, of his own
volition, led a cavalry charge that rescued the survivors of
the 74th, although few of Colonel Orrock's pickets
survived. ^= Despite this tragedy, Wellesley 's tactic of
turning the Mahratta line like a gate from the Kaitna up to
the Juah worked. The British took Assaye and sent the
Mahrattas fleeing pellmell. The victory at Assaye was a
stunning tactical success.
Its cost, however, was horrendous. The Indians endured
some 1200 killed and 4800 wounded, which in terms of their
beginning strength of at least 55,000, amounts to relatively
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light casualties. The British, on the other hand entered the
battle with about 7,000 troops and suffered 428 killed and
1,156 wounded." The British commander bemoaned the
damage. "i acknowledge," he said, "that I should not like
to see again such loss as I sustained on the 23rd September,
even if attended by such a gain."- The majority of those
casualties need never have occurred, and would not have if
Orrock had obeyed orders. They were suffered by his pickets
and the 74th who followed."
Assaye was notable for its risk and its daring and
offensive spirit. Major General Wellesley knew the quality
of his own troops and he knew his enemy. Convinced that the
Mahrattas would shrink from the disciplined and orderly
attack of His Majesty's and John Company's regiments,
Wellesley pushed on against the vastly stronger Scindia.
The relentless advance of the redcoats in the face of brutal
artillery fire must have unnerved the Mahrattas. Wellesley'
s
tactical plan was chancy but sound, considering his enemy
and the alternatives available to the redcoats. Had he
turned away from Scindia, the Mahrattas would surely have
pursued him. Nor could he have afforded to wait for
Stevenson. And even had Stevenson arrived, he could not have
helped much, crowded as he would have been into the
abbreviated battlefield at Assaye. Finally, using his
superior discipline and quite unorthodox tactics, Wellesley
maneuvered his force from a vulnerable position to one of
far greater advantage. By so doing, he negated the advantage
Scindia had previously enjoyed. Indeed, «hen asked later
What was the best fighting he ever did, the Duke replied,
"Assaye
.
Journeyman General
Arthur Wesley arrived in India as a twenty-eight year
old colonel with little military experience and no military
education. When Arthur Wellesley left for England in 1805,
he was a major general and a Knight of the Bath. His series
of successful campaigns had earned him his promotion. He had
demonstrated talent, dedication and intelligence. Contrary
to the perceived image, he was not a strictly defensive
general. His mind ran decidedly in favor of the offense,
even in the face of vastly superior numbers. In India he had
displayed a talent for maneuver and an expert's eye for the
battlefield. He had seemed to develop a sense for how each
engagement would unfold.
How much had he learned in India that could serve him
well in the future? He would not again attack at night an
unreconnoitered position. Constant battle had honed his
skills as a tactician, and he had learned to maneuver
relatively large numbers of men in the field. He had learned
how to feed and supply an army, in the process acquiring a
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well-deserved suspicion of commissaries.- He had learned
to oversee, personally, arrangements for provisioning
armies. In India he had first used local dealers as both the
sellers and the guardians of their goods, a system that had
transferred the responsibility for the security and
transport of the goods from the army to the merchant. In
India Wellesley had witnessed the animosity that arose from
civilians who saw their property appropriated without
recompense. He had instituted a payment system that would
become standard procedure in Iberia.- In India Wellesley
had come to recognize the importance of adequate transport.
While he was never able to secure it there to his
satisfaction, he planned for it before each campaign, not
during it.«^ As in India, Wellesley would fight in Iberia
over some cart tracks that could barely accommodate
pedestrians. His prior experience with the difficulties of
transport over inhospitable terrain would prove invaluable.
India had taught him much.
It had not taught him, however, the difficult art of
siegecraft or the proper use of artillery. In the
subcontinent the British never had to undertake the grinding
sieges that destroyed cities, people and morale, as they did
in Europe. Wellesley had engaged in a number of siege
operations: Seringapatam (1799); Ahmednuggur (1803); and
Gawilghur (1803). But they were against Indian forts of such
poor quality in their construction that they often could not
55
iBOunt cannon in their defense, and with walls so low that
attackers could scale them easily.- The British could
often end a siege victoriously shortly after they began it.
Wellesley never faced the type of fortress he would
encounter in Spain, such as the Vaubanesque citadel of
Badajoz, with its high walls, trench, glacis, and outer
works, defended by formidable artillery batteries. India
tested his skills on the battlefield, but in no way prepared
him for the complexities and dangers of European-style siege
warfare. Indeed, India may have given him the disastrously-
wrong impression that all siege warfare would resemble what
he had experienced.
He had used artillery in India, but only incidentally.
From the mid-eighteenth century through Viet Nam, artillery
has been the single greatest killer on the battlefield. Yet
Wellesley in India seemed to know only that he needed
cannons, which he may even have considered an inconvenience,
because they were so heavy and difficult to transport.'^
Ironically, he would work tirelessly to transport his
artillery and then seem, many times, to employ his guns only
as an afterthought. Perhaps the superb qualities displayed
by British or British-trained infantry against the
footsoldiers of Indian princes caused him to downgrade the
importance of the big guns. Perhaps the fact that the
artillery moved so slowly that it could not keep up with his
infantry in rapid marches and maneuvers in India led him to
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neglect it.^= Whatever the case, he would have to learn in
Spain What he had failed to learn in India, how to integrate
artillery with infantry and cavalry to form a coherent and
complete fighting army.
Thus when Major General Sir Arthur Wellesley, K.B.,
left India in 1805, he left with a well-deserved reputation
as a man who could supply, administer, and lead to victory
in the field large numbers of British and John Company
soldiers. But because he had not learned much about
siegecraft or the proper uses of artillery, he left India
as, at best, a journeyman general.
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CHAPTER 3
MASTER OF THE DEFENSE
From India to Th^T-ia
Sir Arthur's Indian exploits ended in March, 1805. He
returned to England in September to find that both he and
his successes were all but unknown outside military and
political circles. With Napoleon running roughshod all over
Europe and threatening Britain with invasion, the ancillary
theater of India held little interest for the public at
large. Immediately after his arrival, Wellesley directed his
energies primarily toward the exoneration of his older
brother, Richard, whom the East India Company had sacked.
Richard's efforts to expand British presence and hegemony in
India, a program avidly supported by Arthur, was ahead of
its time in the imperial scheme of things. Richard's tenure
as governor general witnessed protracted fighting throughout
the country. The East India Company, weary of the human,
financial and diplomatic expense, replaced Mornington with
Lord Cornwallis, the paragon of dependable stability.
After Richard returned to England, Sir Arthur set about
his own business. The major general had political
relationships of his own to nurture. Pitt had held Wellesley
in very high regard and continued to do so. They rode
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together one day from Wimbledon to London, "very slowly," as
Arthur wrote to his brother:
hiT. .^T^ f^ll opportunity of discussing withm and explaining all the points of our late system in
Uke?vVn° ^^'^^ objections had been made which were
l^^tJv. ^^^5 impression upon him. . . Upon aU ofthese his mind appeared satisfied.^
Wellesley was anxious to enter the on-going war on the
continent against Napoleon, and, to that end, he secured an
assignment as brigade commander in an expedition intended
for the Elbe in December, 1805. Fortunately, the British
government canceled that mission before the troops could be
committed, because of Bonaparte's seeming invincibility,
especially after the French victories over the Austrians
earlier in October, and the more recent annihilation of the
Russians at Austerlitz.^ The government then managed to
find for Sir Arthur only an insignificant brigade command in
Hastings. Command of a mere brigade in garrison, after
India, would certainly have offended most military officers,
a group not renowned for their humility, but not Wellesley:
I am nim muk wallah, as we say in the East,
that is, I have eaten of the King's salt, and,
therefore, I conceive it to be my duty to serve with
unhesitating zeal and cheerfulness, when and wherever
the King or his Government may think proper to employ
me . ^
The government found him more proper employment in very
short order. From July until September 1807, Sir Arthur
played an important role in the British expedition to
Denmark." Although largely a naval operation, the
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expedition included a^y units sent to capture the Danish
capital city fro™ the landward side as the ships blockaded
the port, wellesley led a force that screened the British
attack on the city and prevented the Danish regulars from
interfering with it. The Danish experience marked the future
field marshal's first encounter with a European force since
the debacle in Flanders twelve years earlier. He performed
well, deflecting several Danish attempts to pierce his
screen and thereby helped to facilitate the rapid
capitulation of the city.
Wellesley returned to England in the autumn of 1807 a
much-lauded man. The next April, the government promoted him
to lieutenant general, the youngest officer of that rank in
the army.^ By this time, Napoleon had created a vassal
state in Spain by deposing the popular Spanish king,
Ferdinand, and installing his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, on
that throne. Napoleon's arbitrary action had so angered the
people of Spain that they had risen up in revolt.-^ Both
Spain and Portugal, the most likely future target of
Bonapartist expansion, pleaded to London for help in the
summer of 1808. The British government responded favorably.
It raised a 9,000 man expeditionary force destined for
Portugal and designated Lieutenant General Sir Arthur
Wellesley as commander.''
Sir Arthur had been long anxious to face the near-
legendary Bonaparte. As his departure neared he remarked:
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"My die is cast.-- He seemed on the verge of realizing his
destiny:
thPv wm *^^^^ "'^^ overwhelm me, but I don't think
afraid if ?h
"'^"^^^^^^
.
First, because I am not
secondlv h^^r' ^^^^^^y^°dy else seems to be; and
™iL'is\^?:e''i"^?L^
-rL^a ^^^^^^
°^
:er:^rT?h-n I
'^^-^ ^-"^"^^
-'i: :-.TsT,
-f- --re^the -tl^s be.un
That short passage supplies a beautifully succinct
insight into Wellesley's military thinking in 1808. First,
he remained convinced that his troops, steady through
discipline, could overcome French superiority of numbers
(which the French would maintain in the peninsula until
1813). Second, he recognized the flaws inherent in French
infantry tactics. The French usually attacked in a column
formation or a combination of line and column that the
French termed the ordre mixte
. Sir Arthur rightly believed
that the highly disciplined two-deep line, bringing far more
muskets to bear on the attackers than could be leveled at
the redcoats at one time, could defeat the Imperial armies
despite their brilliant record against the other continental
forces. Finally, the future field marshal displayed supreme
confidence in his own abilities. Perhaps no quality is more
valuable in a general because it is both highly visible and
contagious. It can turn possible fear and apprehension in
subordinates into an unquenchable thirst for victory.
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Iberia
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The Peninsu lar War
,
1808-1R1 n
Sir Arthur's force arrived in Portugal, at Oporto, on 1
August 1808. Wellesley assembled his men and moved south to
engage the French, who were trying to capture Lisbon. He
defeated the French at Vimiero, only to find himself
superseded by two senior generals, Sir Harry Burrard and Sir
Hew Dalrymple. The most charitable description one can give
these two officers is to call them cautious to a fault. They
ordered him to sign the Convention of Cintra, the terms of
which allowed General Andoche Junot, the French commander,
to quit the battlefield and retreat to Spain unmolested. The
convention and its consequences disgusted Wellesley and
raised a furor in Britain. William Wordsworth wrote
disparagingly that the British generals had ".
. .changed,
.triumph into defeat."^ But a court of inquiry in England
exonerated the lieutenant general completely, and he
returned to Portugal as the unquestioned commander in chief
in the spring of 1809.
Wellesley immediately organized his forces for an
incursion into Spain. The war was unpopular on the home-
front and the government was eager for a quick victory.
Named, on 6 July 1809 Marshal-General of the Portuguese
army, he assigned one of his most dependable lieutenants.
General Sir William Carr Beresford, to train and lead that
force. Sir Arthur, in the meanwhile, ventured into Spain
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along the Tagus River valley and won a masterful defensive
victory over the imperial army at Talavera, with (or rather,
in spite of) his Spanish allies. The smashing victory at
Talavera boosted the morale of the allied armies hugely and
shored up support in Britain for the war effort. It also
prompted the government to raise Wellesley to the peerage as
Viscount Wellington and Baron Duoro.
Lord Wellington now found it increasingly difficult to
work with the often imperious and always obstinate Spanish.
"I find Cuesta [General Gregorio Garcia de la Cuesta, the
commander of the Spanish at Talavera] more and more
impractical everyday," wrote the lieutenant general. "It is
impossible to do business with him and very uncertain that
any operation will succeed in which he has any concern. "^°
Furthermore, following Talavera the Anglo-Portuguese army
\
lay in mortal danger of being isolated from their lines of
communication to Lisbon by interposing French armies.
Communication and cooperation between the Spanish and the
Anglo-Portuguese deteriorated to a point where the British
commander-in-chief, exasperated, retreated to Portugal
leaving the Spanish to their own devices. According to one
historian of the Peninsular War, General Sir William Napier:
The departure of the English army from Spain
was a remarkable epoch in the Peninsular War. The
policy of combining operations, and of striking
directly at the great masses of the French had been
acted upon and failed; the long cherished delusion
relative to Spanish enthusiasm and Spanish efficiency
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was thus dissipated <^i-r^™ -i-k-!
of the struggle Welie;i;v*f^? i ""S"*^"^ ^°
and in Snain L!! ^ ^^^^ warred indeed for Spain
fisheS fn^aAy trouble/°"^""^'S" "^^^ ^P^^"' have
waters ^ win^never trv ^^"^ ^^^"^^^ troubled
speaKing of th-HLSgn^^S'L^^^pfLrrord!^^" ^^^^
The British retreat into Portugal, did, however, bring
some advantages with it. Wellington had always considered
Portugal defensible, even against the apparently formidable
French superiority of numbers.- To ensure the safety of
that haven, in September 1809 the future duke had ordered
the preparation of a series of defenses near Lisbon, into
which he could retire his army should the French threaten to
overwhelm the allies. Kept completely hidden from the
imperial armies, the defenses, known as the Lines of Torres
Vedras, were completed in time for the British to fall
behind them in the winter of 1810, just as a French force
threatened to destroy them. The Napoleonic army instead had
to quit Portugal, frustrated that the British were safe
behind the Lines.
Following the stand at Torres Vedras the Anglo-
Portuguese army prepared to take the offensive. Wellington
had received significant reinforcements and General
Beresford had transformed the Portuguese into a cohesive and
disciplined force. The offensive, however, turned into a
siege campaign. The two eastern Moors' between Portugal and
Spain were guarded by very strong fortresses. In the south
they were Elvas on the Portuguese side and Badajoz on the
Spanish side, and in the north, Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo,
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respectively. In 1811 the French controlled Al.eida, ciudad
Rodrigo and Badajoz. To campaign effectively in western
Spain, Wellington had to make sure the doors remained open
by taking control of the citadels which Lady Longford so
appropriately calls ^the keys to Spain'. He depended upon
support from Lisbon, to which British ships brought the
supplies for the expeditionary force. An enemy in control of
those forts could sally forth to cut the British supply
lines. During 1812, at great human cost, Britain won control
of all three. Following the capture of Badajoz, the last to
fall, Wellington made for Salamanca and fought a stupendous
battle, completely routing the French force of Marshal
Auguste Marmont. The British followed that victory with a
triumphant entry into Madrid.
Then the future duke committed a strategic error. He
tried to capture the heavily-fortified citadel at Burgos.
The French armies, scattered after Salamanca, quickly
reassembled. They not only chased the British away from
Burgos, but sent them reeling all the way back to the safety
of Portugal. That setback proved only temporary. In 1813
Wellington pushed the French all the way to the Pyrenees,
winning a stunning victory at Vitoria on 21 June, for which
he was created field marshal, the first person in the
history of the British army to receive a baton as a symbol
that high rank." He continued his advance, bringing the
Peninsular War to an end with a victory at the battle of
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Toulouse on 10 April 1814. Ironically, Toulouse was
contested four days after Napoleon's abdication (which
brought little consolation to the 1600 Anglo-French
casualties of that battle). Field Marshal the Marquess
Wellington became the Duke of Wellington on 3 May 1814.-
The Peninsular War thus consisted of three distinct
phases. The first was the defense of Portugal, necessitated
by overwhelming French superiority of numbers (in part owing
to a lack of reinforcements from Britain), lack of money for
local procurement and purchase, and, not least, a bare
trickle of resupply from Britain. The second phase involved
siegecraft. Conduct of campaigns far from the home base of
Lisbon required the security of uninterrupted lines of
communication and supply, m order to provide that security,
Wellington had to control the frontier fortresses. The third
phase witnessed the two-year offensive that swept the French
back across the Pyrenees.
The Defense; The Better Part of Valor
Wellesley's task in the spring of 1809 was not to
defeat the imperial French armies in Iberia but, rather, to
avoid being beaten. Simply put, he must hold off the French.
The Iberian portion of Napoleon's Grande Armee was indeed
formidable, exceeding 300,000 troops.'^ The British forces
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in the peninsula numbered barely 20,000.- Even the
combined Anglo-Portuguese army had less than one sixth of
the men of imperial French army. The French enjoyed the
strategic and logistic luxury of interior lines even though
guerrillas threatened those lines more and more as the
campaign progressed. Conversely, sir Arthur's supply lines
stretched back to England from whence little came until
1811. Britain did not, at first, wholly commit itself to the
war in Spain, and that lack of commitment resulted in
generally sporadic and always insufficient financing and
resupply. Reinforcements barely trickled in before 1812.^^
The allied army, furthermore, was allied in name only. The
well-trained British regulars formed the core of the army.
But the Portuguese troops required many months of drill with
a contingent of British cadre to become a sturdy and
dependable force. To their credit, at Talavera they
performed very well, sir Arthur having positioned them so
they needed to maneuver very little." One could
certainly, after Talavera, if not before, describe
Wellesley's force as an Anglo-Portuguese one. The same did
not apply with the Spanish. They were grateful for British
assistance but believed that the redcoats should bow
themselves to the authority of the Spanish Junta. The
British served, after all, in Spain.
Into this situation came a general who had hitherto won
his victories by attacking his foes in battle. Before he
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left for Portugal the future field marshal had studied not
only the tactical doctrines of the British army, but also
those of Prussia, Russia and France. Additionally, sir
Arthur had followed closely the progress of Napoleon and
understood the Frenchman's tactics. Although Wellesley's
confidence in himself and his army remained unshaken, he
became, by force of circumstance, more cautious, "i could
lick these fellows any day," he remarked in 1810, "but it
would cost me 10,000 men, and as this is the last army
England has, we must take care of it."- Circumstances
required the young lieutenant general to become a defensive
commander. As India had schooled him in practicing the
intricacies of the offense, the first years in Iberia would
serve him similarly for the defense. He seems to have
possessed an uncanny knack for this type of combat. In India
he had worked hard to learn to judge the lay of the ground
and how to use terrain to enhance his tactical employments.
The knowledge he had acquired there he turned to its
greatest advantage against the daunting Napoleonic armies.
As a result of his studies and his contact with the
French he formulated a threefold strategy for defeating
them. First, he would protect his infantry for so long as
possible. Without any favorable terrain to shelter them, he
could order them, at least, to lie flat on the ground. But
the future duke usually chose where to give battle, and he
usually chose a position in which the topography favored
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men
hi., atop hills and ridges. There he could position his
on the reverse slope of hills, out of the line of fire.-
If he found himself caught on the forward slope of a rise,
he would keep the infantry out of musket range until the
'
skirmishers and artillery, placed well forward, stood in
peril of being overwhelmed. Stationing his infantry thus
iKade them largely invisible to the opposing general,
preventing the enemy from determining troop dispositions, it
also minimized the toll French artillery - which they
habitually used to bombard an enemy preparatory to their
assaults
- would take on the infantry. Not knowing
Wellesley's troop dispositions or having any idea of the
effect of his artillery on the British, a French commander
could not focus his attack or even know the strength or type
of the British forces he faced. As a result, time and again
the French would attack, always uphill, a force of unknown
strength and disposition.
To ensure their ignorance, he developed a second
tactic. He would deploy light infantry skirmishers - in no
actual formation - to disrupt the first enemy attackers to
appear. These skirmishers, often as much as a third of his
infantry, would engage the French skirmishers, or
tirailleurs
.
The French had used them throughout Europe with
great success, as Wellesley knew because of his studies and
observations. If his own skirmishers could deflect the
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French ones, the tirailleurs would not be able to probe his
lines and detect his strengths and weaknesses, particularly
the position Of the
.najority of his infantry, lying in wait
for a major assault.
Finally, he intended always to protect his flanks. If
he coyId find natural geographical features to do so, fine.
If not, he would detail enough troops (usually cavalry) to
carry out the job. Wellesley hoped to prevent enfilade fire
and flanking attacks by anchoring his wings in villages, or
on river banks, or on ground presenting other topographical
obstacles to the enemy. This practice he hoped would reduce
or even negate the advantages of superior numbers, which the
French usually possessed. An enemy commander would lose the
option of simultaneous attacks at multiple points. Patient
and careful selection of the place of encounter by a
commander can certainly work to overcome his numerical
inferiority, as Sir Arthur hoped to show. He would now test
his theories in the field and find them fully justified. His
defensive brilliance bested the more numerous French at
Talavera, Bussaco and at the Lines of Torres Vedras.
Talavera
The British field force ventured into Spain in the
spring of 1809, soon after Wellesley 's return from the
Cintra inquiries. Early July found Sir Arthur still trying
to operate in conjunction with the Spanish, making this
sortie an effort at combined operation. The British
commander in chief marched the Anglo-Portuguese force of
20,000 along the Tagus River valley to join the 27,000
infantry and 6,000 cavalry of General Gregorio Garcia de la
Cuesta near Talavera." The lieutenant general believed
that the combined allied army of 56,000 could easily hold or
even defeat the assembled 34,000 troops of French Marshal
Claude Victor. The success of the operation depended on
keeping a second French force, that of General Francois
Sebastiani, from uniting with Victor. Wellesley and Cuesta
agreed to dispatch General Francisco Venegas' Army of La
Mancha to keep Sebastiani occupied."
Venegas failed to contain Sebastiani 's force. It joined
Victor's on 26 July bringing the French strength to around
50,000, roughly equal that of the allies. The allied
force was, however, markedly weaker than the French because
of the untested Portuguese and the proven unreliability of
the 34,000 Spanish. Wellesley, by winning a battle of wills
against Cuesta, selected the site of the battle;
Talavera.^^ Anchoring his right flank on the Tagus, in the
village proper, the lieutenant general arrayed his lines
northward along a rise just west of a brook, the Portina
Stream. Sir Arthur secured his left on the high ground of
the Cerro de Medellin. This position shows superbly
72
73
Wellesley^s cogent terrain analysis. The Tagus prevented an
enemy flanking attack from the south, thus making the right
secure. The stream, combined with the upslope, provided a
double Obstacle to attackers against the lines arrayed
between the village and the cerro. Finally, Wellesley
entrusted his left flank, on the high ground of the cerro,
to one of his most able division commanders. General sir
Rowland Hill. The left was additionally buttressed by
cavalry. By common consent, Cuesta placed his Spanish
divisions along the brook, closest to the town, where the
terrain was steepest and most easily defensible, masked as
it was by olive groves.
The two opposing forces engaged in minor combats at
Alcabon and Salinas prior to the battle proper. During the
action at Salinas, 10,000 Spanish fled the field at the
first sound of musket fire, some of it their own. Even
though Cuesta was able to recover some of the fleeing
soldiers the net loss came to over 6,000 troops. ^'^ This
episode, indicative of the unreliability of Spanish troops
in combined operations, served irretrievably to undermine
Wellesley's confidence in his ally.
The actual fighting in the prepared positions at
Talavera began on 27 July, continued throughout that night,
and ended in the late afternoon of the 28th. For practical
purposes the battle of Talavera pitted 40,000 French against
20,000 British. After one probing attack early in the
74
afternoon of the 27th, the French largely ignored the
geographically-unassailable position occupied by the
Spanish. All the French effort, thereafter, focused on the
British lines. They first attacked Hill's division on the
cerro. His veterans of Vimiero from the protection of their
position repulsed Victor's assault with deadly volley fire.
Victor launched a second attack at the cerro, this time
under cover of darkness, augmenting it with a flanking
attack from the north. Confident there would be no night
action, the Anglo-Portuguese forces were literally caught
napping. But Hill's division repulsed the French yet again
using disciplined volley fire while Wellesley's well-placed
cavalry interdicted the French flanking attack. Victor now
attempted a massive frontal assault on the morning of the
28th. Attacking into the teeth of the redcoat defense on the
cerro, the French columns again faced withering, disciplined
volley fire. Until now General John Sherbrooke's brigade,
deployed immediately south of the cerro, had remained
virtually untouched. Sherbrooke pivoted his force to the
left and raked the French columns with a terrible flanking
fire. That broke the French attack, and they fled the
battlefield. Outnumbered two to one, Wellesley's superior
position and disciplined troops had suffered 5,000
casualties to the 7,000 of the French. "The battle of
Talavera was the hardest fought of modern times," wrote the
British commander. "The fire at Assaye was heavier while it
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lasted; but the battle of Talavera lasted for two days and a
night.
Wellesley became Viscount Wellington on 4 September
1809, in recognition of the victory at Talavera. He could
not long savor that honor, however. He had to retreat into
Portugal because Marshal Soult's 50,000-man force approached
rapidly from the northwest in an attempt to cut off
Wellington's escape route. During this retreat the British
general secretly ordered the construction of a series of
defensive belts in Portugal near Lisbon.- These defenses,
which would become known as the Lines of Torres Vedras,
would prove the salvation of the British effort in Iberia
one year later. As the Anglo-Portuguese force, forever
separated from the Spanish army, retreated into the relative
safety of Portugal, the French set about the detailed
destruction of the Spanish. They completed the task by 1810.
Bussaco and Torres Vedras
Wellesley kept his force in Portugal for over a year,
husbanding assets and supplies. Although logistics improved
and reinforcements trickled in, neither came in sufficient
quantity to convince the lieutenant general to venture
across the frontier during that year. Napoleon, meanwhile,
had determined to drive out all British forces, the ^hideous
leopard' as he called the., fro. Iberia. The e.peror created
the Army of Portugal, numbering 138,000 men, and installed
Marshal Andre Massena as commander.- Napoleon ordered his
marshal to
" .
.
.put himself in a position to hold in
check 25,000 English commanded by General Wellington, and to
follow the army to attack and destroy it."- Massena began
his preparations to achieve that goal in April, 1810.
Wellington, meanwhile, continued to strengthen his
defenses at Torres Vedras, named for the eponymous town that
served as its all-important central foundation. Planning had
begun after a Portuguese officer, Major Jose Maria das Neves
Costa, conducted a reconnaissance of the area north of
Lisbon in late 1808 and forwarded his annotated maps and
recommendations to the British commander in chief. sir
Arthur then, together with Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Fletcher, the chief British engineer in the peninsula,
conducted his own reconnaissance in September of 1809."
They determined the best locations for a myriad of defensive
installations they believed necessary to stop the French
before they could reach Lisbon. The rough, unforgiving
mountains and the few roads virtually guaranteed the
specific avenues of approach any attacker would have to use.
Wellington dispatched a memorandum to Colonel Fletcher on 20
October 1809. In it he detailed how the engineer should
establish two or three belts of works that would render the
Anglo-Portuguese position impregnable to French assault. He
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directed Fletcher to construct da.s, redoubts, signal posts,
barriers, entrenchments and other defensive works.-.
Why did Wellington undertake such a massive project? He
outlined his reasons in a Memorandum on the Defence of
Portugal, solicited from him by the British Secretary of
State, Lord Castlereagh. The Memorandum shows Wellington's
clear understanding of the situation he presently faced and
his almost clairvoyant view of the future war in the
peninsula.
I have always been of the opinion thatPortugal might be defended, whatever might be theresult of the contest in Spain, and that in the
meantime measures adopted for the defence of Portugalwould be highly useful to the Spaniards in their
contest with the French. My notion was that thePortuguese military establishment ought to be revived
and that in addition to those troops His Majesty oughtto employ about 20,000 British troops, including about4,000 cavalry. My opinion was that, even if Spain
should have been conquered, the French would not be
able to overrun Portugal with a smaller force than
100,000 men. As long as the contest may continue inSpain, this force [the 20,000 British troops], if it
could be placed in a state of activity, would be highly
useful to the Spaniards, and might eventually decide
the contest.
Other portions of the Memorandum argued that the
French might even need more than 100,000 troops to dislodge
the defenders, but that the probability of their being able
to march a force of that size through the harsh, barren
Portuguese interior was very unlikely. The Memorandum also
predicted the campaign in Iberia would drag on for quite a
while. Given that probability, defending the Lisbon
peninsula would bring the French up short, a legitimate"
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tactic in a protracted campaign. Wellington's views ran
contrary to the conventional military wisdom of the day. For
instance, six months before Sir Arthur's communication to
Castlereagh, the late Sir John Moore, the much-respected
defender of Corunna, had argued, "generally that the
frontier of Portugal is not defensible against a superior
force." Sir John said: "it is an open frontier, all equally
rugged, but all equally to be penetrated. If the French
succeed in Spain it will be vain to attempt to resist them
in Portugal."- Wellington did not dismiss Moore's
judgment lightly. "The greatest disadvantage under which I
labour [preparing the Lines]," sir Arthur observed, "is that
Sir John Moore gave an opinion that the country could not be
defended by an army under his command. "^^ But Wellington
stuck to his own views because Moore had never been to
Portugal to assess the situation with his own eyes. In the
final analysis. Lord Castlereagh accepted Sir Arthur's
opinions. Massena's Army of Portugal would, to its
misfortune, test the results a year later.
The fixed fortifications of the Lines, manned by
regulars, comprised only half of the defensive scheme. In
addition, Wellington enlisted the aid of a huge force of
irregulars to harass and molest the French in any efforts
they made to advance and live off the land. He found this
relatively easy to accomplish because he had continued his
policies, first begun in India, of remunerating civilians
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for goods and services provided to his soldiers. Lord
Wellington, furthermore, punished pillagers ruthlessly,
further endearing the British commander to the Portuguese.
They especially appreciated Wellington's methods since they
had experienced the French withdrawals of 1808 and 1809,
marked by cruelty, pillage and rape. Thus, when the British
commander in chief called for irregulars and special
sacrifices by all of the people, he met almost universal
cooperation, even when he told the Portuguese to remove all
foodstuffs and materiel behind the Lines or, if not able to
do so, destroy them. The Portuguese would thus deny the
French invaders the means to subsist, while harassing them
constantly by guerilla operations.
Massena, with 138,000 men, began his invasion of
Portugal in 1810, unaware of the obstacles Wellington had
put in his way. First he besieged and captured the
fortresses guarding the northeastern approach into the
country, Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida." As the French
marshal moved into the interior, Wellington kept his own
Anglo-Portuguese army of 52,000 just out of reach, never
allowing his force to become decisively engaged with the
vastly greater numbers of French. Massena, for his part,
soon experienced the results of Wellington's work with his
Portuguese friends. "It is impossible to find worse roads
than these," wrote Massena. "All our marches are across a
desert; not a soul to be seen anywhere; everything is
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abandoned.-. The French marshal finally, however, ^found'
Wellington near Bussaco on 25 April 1810.
Wellington had intended he do so. The British general
had discovered a defensive position to his liking. He had
deployed his 52,000 men and their 60 guns on a ridge, nine
miles long. From atop it they had an excellent view of the
battlefield into which geography would funnel the French.
The steep slope of the ridge protected the allied front and
flanks. The Mondego River further guarded the allied right.
The height of the ridge essentially neutralized Massena's
artillery, which he had struggled to drag through the narrow
passes of the precipitous mountains of northern Portugal.
Early nineteenth-century cannon could hurl their balls only
at low velocity with a resulting arcing trajectory. As a
result they could not fire upward very effectively against
troops deployed as were the allies. Wellington's guns, by
contrast, could work with deadly effect on an enemy climbing
up the steep sides of the ridge. Massena, furthermore, had
managed to assemble only 65,000 of his army for battle.
These troops, to reach their enemies, would have to attack
up the steep defile without the benefit of artillery
support
.
The battle of Bussaco followed. The Napoleonic armies
had hitherto enjoyed success throughout Europe by utilizing
column formations in the attack. They did so at Bussaco,
attacking uphill in dense, compact columns. Disciplined
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British infantry volley fire joined British artillery -
hurling canister and grape shot - in tearing to shreds the
thick formations crawling up the incline of the ridge.
The French charged repeatedly in their coluinns, but
could never break the British, who inflicted terrible
damage. General Maximilien Foy, who led a column in that
assault, vividly described the carnage:
My heroic column, much diminished during the
ascent, reached the summit of the plateau, which was covered
with hostile troops. Those on our left made a flank movement
and smashed us up by their battalion volleys; meanwhile,
those on our front, covered by some rocks, were murdering us
with impunity. The head of my column fell back to its right,
despite my efforts; I could not get them to deploy, disorder-
set in, and the 17th and 70th raced downhill in headlong
flight.
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Finally, beaten badly, all the French had to give up
the assault. They had lost 5,000 men to the allies' 1,250.
Wellington had broken the code. Napoleonic armies, blindly
adhering to their mentor's tactics, had fallen victim to
commanding position and volley fire.*^
Rebuffed, Massena still vastly outnumbered his
adversaries. He now redoubled his efforts to catch them.
Wellington retired to Torres Vedras and awaited the French
marshal. Massena finally reached the Lines in October. What
he saw shocked him. He had dismissed as ludicrous the
initial reports of his scouts.- He should have paid
closer attention. For he now found, arrayed before him, 165
fortified sections - redoubts - equipped with 628 guns and
manned by 45,000 Anglo-Portuguese regulars. The redoubts
varied in size and strength with garrisons ranging from 50
to 2,000 soldiers. The defenses were integrated into the
adjoining terrain to form three belts arranged
concentrically on the peninsula. They communicated by signal
telegraph, installed by the Royal Navy. The navy had also
positioned gunboats in the Tagus.*" Massena could find
no way through or around the Lines. His invading Army of
Portugal was impotent, now caught between the Lines to his
front and a very inhospitable group of irregulars to his
rear. With insignificant exceptions, the irregulars had
swept the land of all usable food and forage and had severed
the French lines of communication between Spain and
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Portugal. Massena had no choice but to quit Portugal, unable
to drive the ^hideous leopard' into the sea. By this ti™e
Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese force had bled Massena's army
Of 73,000 men."*
Artillery
Wellington's artillery contributed increasingly to this
bleeding. He used it ever more frequently to ever better
purpose between 1808 and 1811. m part he did so because he
acquired more and more guns and ammunition as the campaign
progressed, and because he had increased and improved
overland transport. In addition, the lieutenant general grew
increasingly more familiar with artillery employment and
capabilities.
He hid his infantry from the French cannoneers, knowing
full well the destructive capability of French artillery. By
contrast his guns, ever growing in numbers, did more and
more damage to the French infantry. At Talavera the British
employed 3 0 guns; at Bussaco, 60; and in the defense of the
lines of Torres Vedras , almost 700.*^ The future field-
marshal obviously came to recognize that artillery could
increase significantly the killing power of his army, an
especially valuable asset in the face of the vastly larger
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French forces. The French lost 5,000 dead at the battle of
Bussaco, the majority victims of British artillery.-
Master of the Defpnc;^
Wellington conducted a handful of major defensive
actions and a host of minor engagements in the Peninsula. At
each of these engagements the French had initiated the
attack, obviously in the belief that they would win. That
faith cost them heavily. They lost the battles and large
numbers of men as well. After the relatively high ten
percent casualties at Talavera, Wellington's men, when
fighting defensively, generally experienced a casualty rate
of under four percent as compared to the eight percent and
higher the French suffered during the same period.^" The
future duke's method of fighting the Napoleonic armies in
Iberia would become so effective that the French generals
would grow genuinely afraid to engage him." Somehow, he
did not seem to fight fairly. How else explain his success
against France's best? Lieutenant Colonel Jean Jacques
Pelet, aide-de-camp to Marshal Massena during the operations
in Portugal, penned a seven-point condemnation of
Wellington's tactical deployments at Bussaco."' Pelet
failed to mention, however, the overwhelming victory this
British general won with his faulty tactics. General Foy
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went even further. He condemned Wellington's perceived
preference for the defense as a dishonorable means of
conducting war.^°
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CHAPTER 4
SIEGECRAFT IN THE PENINSULA
Sieqecraft; WpI 1 i ngton ^ k Anhin es
in the^™aSrof"°"^ that the record of the Peninsular army
Its anna?"" ''^^ """^^ brilliant page in^
Sir Charles Oman^
The conduct of sieges is as old as combat itself. With
the advent of effective artillery, sieges usually progressed
in a standard fashion. The besiegers first surrounded the
fort, fortress or city, cutting it off from outside help.
Next they bombarded the curtain walls until the artillery
had breached them. Finally, the besiegers assaulted their
enemy through the breaches. The conduct of the siege
campaign in nineteenth-century Iberia was very rudimentary,
however, even by contemporary standards. Part of the reason
for this primitiveness owed to the extreme difficulties both
sides encountered attempting to transport the artillery
necessary to breach the walls of the fortresses. Siege
artillery, conventionally referred to as the siege train,
weighed much more than field artillery because the guns were
much larger in caliber and of more rugged construction,
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hence heavier than the field pieces. Only these behemoths
could fire the large shot fired at the high velocity
necessary to batter the walls of the fortresses. The
smallest practical component of a siege train was the
eighteen-pounder (18-pdr).^ Twenty-four pounders (24-pdrs
were probably the best combination of power to weight.
Thirty-two pounders (3 2-pdrs) were the most powerful but,
course, much heavier than those of smaller caliber.
Moreover, the ox-cart ruts that passed for roads in Spain,
usually in deplorable condition, often made overland
transport, when possible, a nightmare. Under those
circumstances, the greater portability of the 18- and 24-
pdrs far overshadowed their relatively lower firepower.
Ammunition, of course was also very heavy and in chronical
short supply. Finally, the British artillery corps often
lacked sufficient numbers of trained artillerists.
The successful conduct of a siege required not only
heavy guns with trained artillerymen but also, and
indispensably, a body of trained engineers. The engineer
corps existed in little more than name in the British army
Its officers, good, bad and indifferent, gained promotion
only by seniority. Wellington's chief engineer in the
peninsula, forty-one year old Lieutenant Colonel Richard
Fletcher, possessed experience and military sagacity far
beyond his rank.^ At the least he should probably have
been a brigadier. The rank and file of the engineer corps,
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the sappers and miners, formed only a small cadre of the
Royal Military Artificers. Unfortunately for Wellington, not
until 1812 did the first of these "trained" sappers and
miners arrive in the peninsular theater. Upon observing them
there, the British commander averred that they "had never
seen a sap, battery, or trench constructed."^ The poor
state of the engineer corps and the siege artillery owed
mainly to the miserliness of the British government, which
had attempted to economize. Britain was an island nation
rich in naval tradition and accustomed to glorious victories
at sea. Sailors such as Drake and Nelson were her heroes.
Land warfare and siegecraft played no part in the great
traditions. Most Englishmen in 1812 probably could name only
one outstanding general from their history; the Duke of
Marlborough. The famed exploits of that revered peer had
taken place 100 years ago, well beyond the memory of people
living in the 1800 's. Moreover, Britain had been at war with
France almost continuously since the French Revolution.
During that 20 years, not once had a British force faced the
prospect of a siege against a properly constructed and
prepared fortress.^ It is, therefore, not surprising that
siegecraft was foreign to the British army in the peninsula.
General Wellington's experiences in the art were, at
best, superficial. The native forts of India were old in
design and poor in construction. The flimsy walls of the
fort at Assaye could not even support the weight of
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Scindia's guns. Often the mere presence of the redcoats
catapulted the Indians into flight, obviating the necessity
for any sort of siege. India had provided Wellington with
little preparation for the scientifically-designed citadels
of Iberia.
"The truth is," complained the British commander in
chief, "that, equipped as we are, the British army are not
capable of carrying on a regular siege. "^ Equipped or not,
the British would find their activities in the Peninsular
War confined to the successful defense of Portugal unless
they could control the fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and
Badajoz. Those two citadels, held by French regulars,
guarded the best routes between Spain and Portugal. He knew
he had to take those roads to supply and move his army. In
the interior of Spain, Wellington would also find himself
involved in the siege of another citadel, Burgos, as part of
a larger offensive campaign against the French. Wellington
took two out of the three in 1812, but at heavy cost. He
felt deeply the human consequences, measured in high
casualty rates, of his mistakes and, therefore, rarely
committed the same error twice. His steadily-decreasing
casualties during the defense of Portugal attest to that
feature of his generalship. Yet the future field marshal's
record in siege operations does not match his record in open
battle, just the reverse. He took higher casualties at
Badajoz than in the earlier effort at Ciudad Rodrigo. The
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last, Burgos, turned into an unqualified failure. He did not
capture the fortress and lost more than 2,000 allied
soldiers dead in the failed effort.'
Ciudad Rodrign
The French believed that the British had gone into
winter quarters in December, 1811, to regroup from the
efforts of that year's campaigns, which had included the
failed first and second sieges of Badajoz.« In the autumn
of 1811 Wellington enlisted Major Alexander Dickson, his
most able artillery advisor, and entrusted him to assemble
and transport a massive siege train from the Atlantic coast
of Portugal to Ciudad Rodrigo. The new siege train consisted
mainly of new iron guns and howitzers of English cast.'
The determined and innovative Dickson used barges to bring
the guns up the Duoro, as far as Lamego. From there,
hundreds of mule, bullock and oxen teams, with wagoners,
took the artillery overland to Almeida. Near there the
British assembled the siege train, with ammunition, a task
they had completed by December, 1811. The entire project
took longer than three months. "The bringing of sixty-eight
huge guns, with proportionate stores, across fifty miles of
mountain was an operation of magnitude;" wrote Sir William
Napier, "five thousand draft bullocks were required for the
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train alone, and above a thousand militia were for several
weeks employed merely to repair the road."- The British
were able to keep all of their considerable efforts to
assemble this formidable siege train a secret from the
French. Wellington's officers knew that surprise was the key
to the operation. Major Edward C. Cocks, an intelligence
officer, wrote to his father:
•
^-^-^ occupied in preparation for
ValenMr.°' '''^^f^ Rodrigo. Marmont has%ne ?o
hear Ce t^n/^^'^^ ^^S'^^^ ^^^^"^^ ^^^^^ if what I
r^^^K ' "^""^ t° interrupt us. Heprobably presumed that we should not attempt a sieqe atthis season of the year.^^
^^-timpu g
The British commander in chief invested Ciudad Rodrigo
between 7 and 10 January 1812. The fortress, of modern
design, had been much battered during the course of the
war.^^ It was also weakly garrisoned. The new siege train
quickly reduced two sections of the curtain wall to rubble.
During this same period, British infantry dug a series of
trenches and saps that allowed the allies to approach the
citadel under cover. The engineers declared the two
breaches, a main one to the right and a smaller one to the
left, sufficiently wide to favor an assault on the 19th,
less than two weeks after the arrival of the besiegers."
Nevertheless, a French force under the command of Marmont
had learned of the siege and had already reached Salamanca.
The allies had to take Ciudad Rodrigo before he arrived to
overwhelm them and lift the siege. Wellington ordered the
92
assault for the evening of the 19th, as soon as there was
enough darkness to cover the attack.- The soldiers
greeted the news with relief, glad they could leave the
trenches they had recently carved out of the frozen soil,
and anxious to be done with living like frozen moles.
Private William Wheeler revealed the troopers' sentiments:
to the cold^winH^ d^ty were not only exposed
visit? nf ^ ^""^ ""^^^ '"''^^ annoyed by the frequent
gins at Ldrf^r ""^^ we could hear the roaring of\he
deduced.- heartily wished the place
That evening the forlorn hope, the small vanguard who
first approached the smaller breach, was led by Lieutenant
John Gurwood. Despite a wound to the head, Gurwood advanced
steadily amidst a terrible fire. He managed to reach the
fortress's governor and accept his sword in surrender.
General Thomas Picton's 3rd Division poured through the
larger breach on the right and the British swiftly occupied
the town. From beginning to end Wellington's siege had
required twelve days. Two years earlier, in 1810, Marshal
Michel Ney had used a full month to do the same thing. The
allied victory came at a price of heavy casualties, as did
most sieges. Wellington lost 1,000 men to the French 500. He
took 2,000 enemy prisoners.
Wellington's swift work thwarted French attempts to
relieve their besieged comrades. He took Ciudad Rodrigo
before the French armies, barely assembled at Salamanca from
their scattered winter quarters throughout Castile, could
move to save it. The Anglo-Portuguese army now possessed the
northern gateway of Spain. Wellington had behaved patiently,
waiting for the siege train so ably managed by Dickson. But
the lieutenant general had acted decisively too, seizing the
opportunity to attack in the middle of the cold, mountain
winter.
The Third Siege of BadRjn7
Following the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington set
off, with only a small part of his staff, for Badajoz in the
south. He intended to besiege Badajoz for the third
time. This time he hoped to achieve it with the army of
General Sir Rowland Hill, encamped in the vicinity of
Elvas." Twice before, but only once under Wellington's
direct supervision, the allies had besieged the city in
1811. At the time they lacked any decent siege guns and the
approach of relieving French armies had forced them to
withdraw before they could finish the job. "Since our return
to Penamacor," Private Wheeler wrote, "we have been employed
in assisting the battering train from Saba Gal to Castala
Branco. I understand the train is on the road to Elvas. If
so, Baddajos is the next place to be reduced."^*
General Wellington, lacking adequate transport, could
only send a small portion of the siege train from Ciudad
Rodrigo: sixteen 24-pdrs and the same number of 24-pdr
howitzers. while the besiegers had fewer guns available
at Badajoz than at Ciudad Rodrigo, they still had better
artillery than at the two previous failed efforts. The Royal
Navy, furthermore, reluctantly agreed to send some
additional large-bore guns along the less demanding route
from Lisbon.
The third siege of Badajoz had to succeed quickly, if
it did not, relieving French armies could assault the
besiegers. The allies had to work against the fortress and
against time. But tight schedules do not make for efficient
sieges. The fortress at Badajoz, furthermore, was larger,
stronger and more heavily garrisoned than that at Ciudad
Rodrigo, making it a tougher place to take.==
Badajoz was well-suited to repel attack from the north,
protected, as it was, by the River Guadiana, a waterway that
ran 300-500 yards wide. The nearest usable bridge, at
Merida, lay 30 miles to the east of Badajoz."' The original
fortress, an old Moorish castle, overlooked the river from
the high ground in the northeast corner, where steep cliffs
ran down to the waterside. A wall, built in 1757, enlarged
the fortified area by several times. A curtain wall and
eight bastions guarded the main fortress. The bastions
reached up to 30 feet, the curtain five to eight feet lower.
Outer works consisted of the Picurina Fort to the southeast,
the Pardaleras fort to the southwest
Badajoz
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and the San Roque Lunette, which guarded the bridge across
the Rivallas Brook to the east. A significant hill .ass, San
Cristobal, to the north-northwest of the town, rose more
than one hundred feet above the river. Another fortress,
built upon that promontory, intended to deny the commanding
heights to an attacking enemy.
Wellington had studied the French siege of Badajoz of
1811, which had succeeded. The Gallic attack had focused on
the Pardaleras fort but the British commander refused to
repeat that tactic. His engineers recommended assaulting the
old castle, their plan little changed from the two failed
attempts of the year before.- That idea, too, the general
rejected. Wellington opted instead for an assault across the
marshy lowground to the southeast, near the Trinidad
bastion, one of the eight at Badajoz. The British general
preferred that site, according to the premier siege
historian of the Peninsular War, Sir John Jones, because
"the counterguard in front of the right angle of the bastion
of La Trinidad had been left in an unfinished state.
Wellington may also have chosen La Trinidad in order to
surprise the French, hoping they had left only a small force
to defend it. The commander in chief could ill afford to
remain outside Badajoz for too long, lest the French
coalesce and with their vastly superior numbers converge on
his sieging force. The French garrison knew that a powerful
siege executed via the Pardaleras fort could succeed, since
they had done it in 18n. The two earlier British efforts
had both focused on the old castle, by way of San Cristobal.
It is reasonable to assume that the French would not expect
an attack frcn across the marshes to their south. If they
did, surely they would have either completed the
construction of the wall in that area or at least buttressed
it. But they had done neither.
The allied siege train arrived from Ciudad Rodrigo in
late March of 1812. The assistance provided by the Royal
Navy, less than promised, had forced Major Dickson to
augment his cannon force with whatever he could scrounge at
Elvas. The artilleryman was able to bring 20 guns of
variable caliber and manufacture to Badajoz. This mongrel
collection included bronze Russian 18-pdrs and an assortment
of seventeenth-century pieces of questionable value: "In
general there was room between the shot and the bore to put
a man's finger in," the historian Jones observed.^'' That
many of the bores of these guns were of non-standard
diameter made the already difficult task of resupplying
ammunition even more challenging. Clearly, one would not
expect much accuracy from these batteries. With the
artillery, such as it was, at last present, the engineers
could finally begin their work against La Trinidad.
They began construction of their trenches and batteries
under cannon fire from the Picurina fort, a mere 400 yards
from the Trinidad bastion. To stop this harassment and
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operate their guns safely, once e.placed, the British had to
take Picurina. They carried it on 25 March at a cost of
sixty percent casualties out of a storming party of 250.-
The guns then found their way into the batteries and
began pummeling the curtain and the bastion, while the
howitzers lobbed explosive shells over the walls. By 5 April
the firing had created two breaches, one in the bastion and
the other in the curtain wall to its southwest. The
engineers deemed them practicable on the 5th, but Wellington
ordered a third breach. The artillery achieved it as well,
at the juncture of the right side of the Trinidad bastion
where it met the curtain wall. On 6 April the commander in
chief ordered an assault at 7 p.m. Delays caused the
schedule to be pushed back three hours until ten p.m. During
those three hours the artillery eased their fire, believing
the assault already to have begun earlier. The French used
the reprieve to shore up the gaps in the walls and load them
with deadly obstacles.
The plan of the assault called for the Light Division
and the 4th Division to storm the three breaches between
them, with the Light Division on the left. The 3rd Division
should sneak north around the San Roque Lunette, traverse
the Rivalles Brook at the Mill Dam and go over the curtain
wall, near the castle, by escalade. Meanwhile, to the north,
the 5th Division should attempt to climb the walls east of
the San Vicente bastion. To facilitate the operations of the
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3rd and 5th divisions (escalades could be very bloody),
Wellington ordered a diversionary attack on the Tete du Pont
fortress, on the north bank of the Guadiana.
At 10 pm. the attack began. The 3rd, 4th and Light
divisions Charged into a maelstrom of fire. A survivor of
that terrible night. Major George Simmons of the 95th
Rifles, described his attack into hell:
fir-c. ^-F
columns moved on under a most dreadfulre of grape that mowed down our men like grass We
can?.fr^
the Pallisading and got upon the g^aci^. Myptain was shot in the mouth. Eight or ten officers
resteruoonTh"""^'"'/"'' ^° ^^^^ "° Ladderf:4re
nnwn^h^^ t ^°\^"terscarp from within the ditch.Down these we hurried, and as fast as we got down
^r^nf0^°''''^'''^ ^° breaches, where a most frightfulscene of carnage was going on. Fifty times they [theFrench] were stormed, and as often without effect, theFrench cannon sweeping the ditches with a mostdestructive fire. The ditch, from the place where weentered near the top of the breaches, was covered withdead and dying soldiers. If a man fell wounded, ten toone that he ever rose again, for the volleys of
musketry and grapeshot that were incessantly poured
amongst us made our situation too horrid for
description. I had seen some fighting, but nothing likethis. We remained passively here to be slaughtered as
we could do the besieged little injury from the
ditch.
The thundering fire of the French defenders stopped the
4th and Light divisions cold, inflicting them with
staggering casualties. The 3rd Division under the crusty
Picton, however, managed to carry the castle. General Sir
James Leith's 5th Division saved the night. Attacking the
San Vincente bastion under fierce fire from above, the
redcoats pressed their way forward relentlessly. They
brought up their ladders, scaled them and hurtled over the
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walls. A junior officer in Leith's division described how
they managed the seemingly impossible:
requla^^d?"?nh^^\^^ l^^^ surrounded by a
ii?h ^ ''^^^^ ^^^^^ ^° descent but
and th^
assistance of the ladders which we carriede rampart itself, nearly 30 ft hiah wi^h
interfered Cith ^
occasion to such as we were not
cou^d ^^?=v.V K time before we
Se h^/?^ f°°ting upon the rampart, but. . !
?he ?own h^r' lifted, four regimeAts intiT:he t before midnight. '°
Picton joined Leith and Badajoz belonged to Wellington.
After the siege, Wellington viewed the carnage at the
breaches. All told, he had suffered almost 5,000 casualties.
To the great surprise of his staff, their stoic leader lost
his almost mythical self-control and wept. The next day he
penned his report to Lord Liverpool, the minister of war:
"The capture of Badajoz affords as strong an instance of the
gallantry of our troops as has ever been displayed. But I
greatly hope that I shall never again be the instrument of
putting them to such a test."^'
He had been the instrument. To him belonged the
victory. To him also fell the responsibility for the price
of that victory. His plan of attack disregarded the advice
of the engineering officers, whom he liked and admired as
men, but in whose professional abilities he had little
confidence. "Our engineers, though brave and well-
educated," he wrote, "have never turned their mind to the
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mode Of conducting a regular siege.-, ^hat plan included
two escalades, in addition to storming the breaches, and the
"diversions", not the main assault, succeeded.
He attacked Badajoz, significantly stronger than Ciudad
Rodrigo, with less than half of the artillery power he had
employed against the northern citadel. Wellington acted as
his own chief of staff for engineering matters. He ordered
his attack prematurely, before the breaches were truly
practicable. In part he felt he had to do so because the
French armies rapidly bore down on Badajoz to relieve the
beleaguered city. But having made the decision, he should
have gotten his men into position on time, especially with
time at a premium. Instead, for one reason or another, he
delayed moving against the breaches for three hours after
the scheduled departure, a delay that allowed the defenders
to regroup and prepare to repel the attackers. The siege of
Badajoz, ultimately successful, cost him five times the
losses he had suffered at Ciudad Rodrigo.
Burgos
On 22 July 1812 Lord Wellington's Anglo-Portuguese army
shattered the French Army of Portugal at the battle of
Salamanca, arguably the finest offensive operation conducted
by the future field marshal. Following that astounding
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success, however, ca.e a dile..a. if he pursued the re.nants
Of the Ar.y of Portugal, the other French forces would .ost
certainly unite and, in their lessened but still greater
strength, destroy the allies. So, like Napoleon in the day
before Waterloo, Wellington tried to catch and engage singl
enemy armies. For that reason, he marched to Madrid to try
to lure Marshal Soult's small Army of the Centre into
battle. Soult would have none of it and fled. Wellington's
Anglo-Portuguese force, victorious but exhausted after
Salamanca, occupied the capital city of Spain, now devoid of
enemy soldiers. Meanwhile, the other French armies worked to
recover and regroup. The Army of Portugal, somewhat
reconstituted after their drubbing at Salamanca, began to
demonstrate in the Duoro River valley. The Army of the
North, farther to the northeast, moved westward toward the
Army of Portugal, in early September Wellington moved out of
Madrid toward Burgos hoping to block the union of those two
French forces. He now chose to besiege the fortress, and the
Anglo-Portuguese army invested Burgos on 19 September 1812.
The siege of Burgos seemed doomed from the beginning.
The twin operations of Badajoz and Salamanca had thinned
heavily the ranks of the best divisions of Wellington's
army: the 3rd, 4th, 5th and Light. The commander in chief
had left them in Madrid to rest and had taken with him less
experienced units, thinking of Burgos as only a minor
operation. The Anglo-Portuguese had only three 18-pdr
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battering guns with a paltry 1,306 round shot. The rest had
not caught up from the previous campaigns and Wellington did
not expect them for several weeks. 3^ Against those three
guns stood a very stout fortress the strength of which the
British commander grossly underrated: "it was not unlike a
hill fort in India, and I had got into a good many of
them."- He could scarcely have been more wrong. The works
at Burgos were awesome. No hill fort, it had a triple layer
of defenses and a formidable battery of artillery. The first
layer, or wall system, around the old keep, included a
casemated battery built at Napoleon's direction. The second
and third layers, concentric walls with modern parapets,
revetments and ravelins covered every approach. The
logistical depot for the Army of the North, it contained
more than ample supplies. Wellington soon began to realize
that Burgos would be no easy job, contrary to his initial
expectations. Between the obviously formidable fort and his
own dearth of proper siege equipment he became, in his own
words, "A little apprehensive that I have not the means to
take this castle. "^^
Uncharacteristically, he now vacillated. He did not
withdraw but neither did he press home a full-scale assault.
The general, now an earl, began a series of disjointed and
fragmented attacks that signified both a lack of mission and
a lack of confidence. As early as 5 October the earl had
remarked that, "our final success is. . .doubtful.", but he
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nonetheless continued the assaults through 18 October."
With the Armies of Portugal and the North closing in on hi.,
Wellington abandoned the operation on 21 October. The Anglo-
Portuguese army then had to retreat in a headlong rush to
Portugal
.
Understandably, Wellington's stock dropped with
everyone, but especially with his troops. When he had
visited some of his soldiers in the hospital after the
battle of Albuera which followed the failed first siege of
Badajoz, where he had not commanded personally, they had
said: "If you had commanded us, my Lord, there wouldn't be
so many of us here."- After Burgos a more common
sentiment was: "if ever a man ruined himself, [Wellington]
has done it. For the last two months he has acted like a
madman."^'
The siege failed abjectly. It cost over 2,000 lives for
no apparent gain. Why? Lady Longford believes exhaustion
brought on by too many years of war caused the earl's
unorthodox and uncharacteristic behavior. *° Wellington's
tendency to do everything for himself certainly lends
credence to the Longford thesis. Michael Glover argues that
while a tactical failure, the siege at Burgos brought
strategic advantages. By forcing the Armies of Portugal and
the North to come to the aid of Burgos, the future field
marshal allowed the guerrillas of Navarre and the Basque
country to wrest control of their provinces away from the
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French, thereby enabling the spring offensive of 1813. That
conclusion, however, reaches beyond the available facts.
Glover's contention that the "fiasco at Burgos led directly
to the victory at Vitoria," may be true.- But did
Wellington so plan it? Did he consciously believe his siege
of Burgos would free Navarre and the Basque country? if so,
Wellington's official dispatches and personal correspondence
do not so demonstrate. Surely he would have tried to
mitigate the debacle if he had the means. Instead he said: 1
"It was entirely my own act.— He seemed to have had no
master strategic plan in mind when he invested the fortress.
Burgos was a tragic defeat born of over-extended lines, poor
preparation and, as Lady Longford avers, a general much in
need of a rest. Sir John Fortescue, in his Historv of thP
British Army wrote:
. .the abortive siege of Burgos was
the most unsatisfactory operation on Wellington's part
during the whole of the Peninsular War."*^
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CHAPTER 5
THE CONSUMMATE FIELD MARSHAL
The Concl usion of th^ Peninsulai- w^r-
After the defensive campaign of 1809 through 1811, sir
Arthur's detractors called him cautious and timid. Following
the very sanguine sieges of 1812, these same pundits accused
him of being rash to a fault. ^ Wellington's army almost
disintegrated during the retreat to Portugal following
Burgos, a development that the earl found intolerable:
The officers lost all control over their men.Irregularities and outrages of all descriptions were
committed with impunity, and losses have been sustained
which ought never to have occurred.
. .1 have no
hesitation in attributing these evils to the habitualinattention of the officers of the regiments to their
duties
A reaffirmation of order and discipline ensued as the
peninsular army went into its winter quarters near Ciudad
Rodrigo. Signally, Wellington probably committed himself
this time to the offense for his next campaign.
In the spring of 1813 the allied army again sallied
forth into Spain, but this time under far more favorable
circumstances than in the past. First, the British had
poured reinforcements into Portugal throughout the winter.
The forces now under Wellington's command numbered over
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200,000.3 That nu.ber included, after 22 September 1812,
the armies of Spain after the Junta bestowed the title of
Generalissimo of the Spanish Armies upon the British
general. The French forces, on the other hand, had shrunk to
a little over 230,000. For the first time the allies would
operate in an environment of virtual parity with the
imperial armies."
Wellington decided to advance along the Salamanca road
from Ciudad Rodrigo and, on 22 May began the march eastward.
The French fled before him. The Gallic armies were war-weary
and unreinforced because of Napoleon's greater problems in
Russia.- The French abandoned Burgos, Wellington's nemesis
of 1812, under pressure from the allied juggernaut. Farther
and harder the earl pushed his army, across the difficult
and unforgiving terrain of northern Spain. In fewer than 30
days the allied force marched almost 300 miles and found
intself in position to attack Bilbao, Vitoria or both. King
Joseph, Napoleon's brother, chose to offer battle at
Vitoria
.
The southern portion of the allied field force, that
closest to Vitoria, arrived near the city on the evening of
20 June 1813. Almost immediately the British commander-in
-chief recognized that King Joseph, who had taken command
from his brother's marshals, was over-extended and
disorganized. The French mustered some 55,000 men stretched
along a twelve mile front, while the king directed his
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energies toward dispatching his amassed booty safely over
the Pyrenees.
^
into this chaos Wellington brought 80,000
footsore and irate troops determined to make the ^Frenchies'
pay for the discomfort caused by the lengthy march.'
The British Lion who had defeated the Tiger of Mysore
could finally attack. He ordered a simultaneous three-
pronged assault. First, General Thomas Graham's 20,000 men
would hit Joseph from the north. From the southwest. General
Hill's 20,000 troops should descend upon the Imperial forces
from the Puebla heights. The largest force, 30,000 men
grouped into four divisions, would charge from the west: the
3rd and 7th Divisions to the north near Mendoza; the Light
Division at Tres Puentes; Cole's 4th near Nanclares; and
Wellington's column just to the south of Villodas. The
balance of the allied force, some 10,000, would form the
reserve
.
The operation worked as planned. The simultaneous
attacks from the north, west and southwest completely
overwhelmed the French. King Joseph had no option but to
run, and flee he did. For their part, the allies did not
pursue the retreating French army as they should have.
Nevertheless, the ^ Sepoy General', as Napoleon disparagingly
referred to Wellington, was after Vitoria the unquestioned
champion of Spain. Following that battle, the government
honored Wellington with the highest military rank it could
bestow: field marshal.
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Vitoria
Throughout the balance of 1813 and the first part of
1814, Sir Arthur pushed the French further and further back
over the Pyrenees. The Peninsular War ended on 10 April
1814, after the battle of Toulouse. On 3 May 1814 the
British commander attained the highest rank in the peerage
when he became the Duke of Wellington.
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on
The Duke of Wellington's prosecution of the Peninsular
war smacks of military genius. He did not enjoy parity of
numbers until 1813, five years into the conflict, yet he not
only avoided defeat during that time, but also made
remarkable progress against the veteran French armies. To be
sure, the British general had help, not the least of which
came from the French marshals. A sniping and jealous group,
they bungled many opportunities to unite and crush the
allies because of petty envy and adolescent intrigues.
«
Wellington, thanks to his intelligence network, usually knew
of the movements of the separate French forces and retired
quickly when they infrequently united. Additionally, as the
war progressed, Napoleon removed large numbers of troops
from Iberia, especially before his march to Moscow in 1812.
Conversely, the British, buoyed by both their army's
intermittent success and Napoleon's setbacks, finally began
to reinforce significantly the peninsular army.
By 1813, at the start of the allied push to the
Pyrenees, they actually outnumbered the French in the field.
Even though King Joseph's various armies numbered 230,000 in
early 1813, many of these soldiers needed to occupy the
hostile countryside, garrison the cities and perform other
ancillary duties that kept them out of the field formations.
The duke, on the other hand, could put as many men into the
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field as his commissaries could support. The fact remains,
however, that the allies were hugely outnumbered for five'
years. Yet they and their general endured. He probed and
tested but refused to engage decisively the numerically
superior French unless at the time and place of his own
choosing, as at Vimiero, Bussaco and Salamanca. The field
marshal fought a war of attrition waiting patiently for the
emperor to deplete his own forces.
Coalition Warrinr-
Sir Arthur possessed an attitude and philosophy aptly
suited to his situation as commander of a multi-national
force. In the Peninsula, as in India, the field marshal
commanded several different forces, speaking several
different languages, intent on several different purposes.
One could scarcely expect the Iron Duke to manage a decent
military parade from such a hodge-podge, yet by carefully
culling his officer corps for acceptable generals and
colonels who fit into the Wellington mold, he managed his
coalitions to victory. Coalition warfare requires the
coalition commander to trust and believe his alliance can
achieve victory. The nucleus of the alliance must also trust
in the competence of the commander. A successful coalition
operation requires these two conditions. As they were
present in World War ll with Eisenhower and the Persian Culf
war with Schwarzkopf, so too with Wellington. As a young
colonel in India, sir Arthur successfully formed two
alliances, the first with the Nizam of Hyderabad against the
Mysoreans and the second with a number of princely states
against the Mahrattas. He learned in the subcontinent always
to keep a nucleus of seasoned and thoroughly reliable troops
(usually British) under his direct control. In Iberia the
Anglo-Portuguese coalition alternately flourished and waned
throughout 1808 and 1809. After Talavera, however, the
bilateral trust crucial to the success of the joint force
grew and cemented the alliance. It was the Anglo-Portuguese
army that provided the seasoned, reliable core during the
lean years before 1813.
Besides trust, patience and diplomacy form important
components of successful alliances. The duke possessed an
abundance of both, but not enough to overcome the titanic
egos of the Spanish generals. No amount of coaxing or
cajoling could move the Spanish to follow any plan framed by
anyone other than one of their own. Aggrieved because
Wellington would subscribe to neither Spanish tactics nor
authority, the Anglo-Spanish martial union did not happen
until the Spanish Junta appointed him Generalissimo of the
Spanish armies on 22 September 1812. Thereafter the allied
army was, in fact, Wellington's army.
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Tactics
The field marshal generally adhered to the tactical
norms of the day. He was not an experimenter. An infantry
commander, the duke believed in the cavalry, artillery and
engineers as ancillary branches whose purpose was to assist
and augment the operations of the foot soldiers. He
distilled the best of General David Dundas' Rules and
Regulations for the movement of His Majesty^s Infantry,
discipline and drill, and applied it remorselessly.' The
infantry weapon of the day was the notoriously inaccurate
musket, but at four rounds per minute, a thin red line could
certainly produce a lethal wall of lead. Wellington
understood that fact, and so he drilled his units until they
were exhausted, and then he drilled them some more. He
emphasized not fancy maneuvers but repeated formation into
line from column and interminable musket drill. His soldiers
needed to perform almost automatically. This performance,
matched to the discipline that is the hallmark of British
infantry, made the 33rd in India and, later, the peninsular
army virtually unbeatable.
As support for infantry, the cavalry and artillery
performed useful service. The cavalry anchored the flanks of
his defensive formations and exploited enemy retreats by
pursuit. Wellington liked to have cavalry buttress his
defensive wings because in that role they augmented his
114
infantry. As pursuers, he found them less satisfactory, m
almost every charge they lost control of their formations
and went galloping off into the countryside providing little
support for the force as a whole. Even as late as 1815 a
cavalry assault at Waterloo went out of control. The Union
and Household Brigades charged forward heroically and
restored the lines that Napoleon's troops had bulged, but
they did not stop there. They continued forward: "all dash,"
wrote a young officer, until they found themselves caught in
the enemy rear, where the French cut them off and massacred
them.- The Scots Greys lost 297 of their 300 men and, in
all, Wellington lost over 2,500 cavalrymen in that one
charge
.
The duke had somewhat better experience with the
artillery. Throughout his peninsular campaigns he utilized
more and more cannon to greater and greater effect. The
influx of dependable, well-manufactured iron guns from
England made his increased use of artillery possible. The
hybrid batteries he had to employ before 1812 lacked a
standard caliber and proved of questionable quality. But as
his batteries became standardized, he no longer had to
transport a virtual warehouse of artillery ammunition to
supply many different caliber guns and could better utilize
his limited transport to bring more and more guns to the
battlefield.
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Finally, the duke mastered logistics. He understood the
connection between supply and performance in the field. A
well-fed, well-Clothed, well-armed force, given discipline
and leadership, ought to beat one lacking those essentials.
Wellington knew that better than any other general of his
era. Napoleon certainly never concerned himself overly with
the welfare of his troops. He had a nearly inexhaustible
supply of privates. The duke usually faced armies greatly
superior in numbers, and so he had to work to husband his
soldiers as best he could. Woe to the commissary who failed
to deliver rations. Heaven help the officer who did not
properly house his soldiers whenever possible. Wellington's
redcoats not only believed that he would lead them to
victory with as few casualties as possible, but that he also
would take care of their essential needs while doing so. The
newly-promoted Segeant Wheeler wrote:
If England should require the service of her
army again, and I should be with it, let me have "Old
Nosey" to command. Our interests would be sure to be
looked into, we should never have occasion to fear an
enemy. There are two things we should be certain of.
First, we should always be as well supplied with
rations as the nature of the service would admit. The
second is we should be sure to give the enemy a d d
good thrashing. What can a soldier desire more."
Intelligence
The field marshal's success in his limited operations
between 1808 and 1813 owed in part to the intelligence
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network he established. A sympathetic populace contributed
critically to that intelligence system. Operating in a
friendly environment enabled Sir Arthur to nurture thousands
Of part-time information sources. The French, by contrast,
battled day and night with a nation of fifth columnists.
Further, Wellington's relationship with the guerrillas
proved extremely beneficial as well to British intelligence
efforts. The guerrillas waged myriad, constant little
campaigns against them, rarely allowing them to rest. While
the guerrillas slaked their thirst for vengeance against the
hated French by killing the messengers who streamed between
French armies, Wellington received the dispatches and
communiques taken from the bodies of the unfortunate
messengers. Finally, not only was communication between
France and Spain always harassed, but the British commander
was able to glean, time and again, the intentions of the
French, courtesy of the captured messages.
Wellington and his Staff
Wellington insisted on doing everything for himself, a
strength, but also a weakness. He conducted personal
reconnaissance whenever possible. All orders issued directly
from him. Every aspect of every operation, down to the
smallest detail he made his responsibility alone. He refused
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to delegate. One of the roost basic of all military tenets,
however, is that a commander should train and develop
subordinates. Wellington failed to do that. If he had been
killed during the course of the Peninsular War, before 1813,
it is doubtful that any of Wellington's lieutenants could
have come forward to lead the army competently. The Iron
Duke never trained his subordinate commanders or staff to
operate with initiative.
As a matter of fact, he often castigated subordinates
who acted of their own volition. When Doctor James McGrigor,
Wellington's chief inspector of hospitals, changed the
evacuation route for the wounded after the battle of
Salamanca, the duke flew into a rage:
I shall be glad to know who is to command thearmy? I or you? I establish one route.
. .you establish
another, and order the commissariat and the supplies bythat line. As long as you live. Sir, never do so again;
never do anything without my orders.
This insistence on control in part accounted for the
notorious failure of his armies to pursue fleeing enemies.
Lieutenant Colonel William Tomkinson averred that the
field marshal was jealous of any British success outside of
his immediate purview: "Lord Wellington may not like to
entrust officers with detachments to act according to
circumstances, and I am quite clear if he approves of much
success, excepting under his own immediate eye.""
One must temper Colonel Tomkinson 's sentiment with the
proven indisciplined performance of Wellington's cavalry, of
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Which Tomkinson was a part, and the often inferior quality
Of the British Officer corps. Many men entered the army
because, as second or third sons of noblemen, they had no
other place to go. Wellington proved himself one of the few
exceptions in the army of that era. Few officers applied
themselves as diligently and tirelessly to excellence. One
of the reasons the duke did everything for himself was to
protect his men from the incompetence of many of the
officers assigned to lead them.
A member of the Third Dragoons, Captain William Bragge
penned a succinct assessment of the field marshal's dilemma
with respect to his officers. After the retreat from Burgos
Wellington had thrown a stinging remonstrance at his
subordinates in the form of a Circular to Officers
Commanding Divisions and Brigades (See Note #2). The London
newspapers got hold of it, and, of course, and perhaps with
glee, published it without permission. Bragge wrote:
I was very sorry to see Lord Wellington's
Letter to his Generals commanding Brigades and
Divisions [of 28th Nov.] at full length in the rascally
London Newspapers with suitable remarks by the Editors,
one of whom cooly observes the Army was in a state of
Mutiny and the Retreat more dreadful than that of the
French through Russia. My own opinion is that Lord
Wellington never wished or intended the aforesaid
Letter to be published, nor was it, I believe, in many
instances read to the Troops but to the Officers only.
It was perhaps rather too violent and never would have
been necessary had his Lordship proper General Officers
under him or Men of his own choosing. At present the
Ministers or Duke of York order out a batch of
Generals, who in general have neither Talent nor
Experience. Some blunder is committed. Lord Wellington
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himself or ac? ulnn^^L
he never bothers to exert
thinv i„ ''^^ Judgement again. Here Tk commences a slackness which is quick"; till
Mischferand'haf "^S"""'— incalc^ able
Tt^^W^'^'^^^ ^^t^^r, .e„
^L^^^H ^""^^y ^^^^P^ Sir S. cotton and I suppose no
iiZsTiii'irj^'^ ^^^^-^ his sta?r
amonast tL f 5^^^ ^^^"^ coxcomical or Old Women,g he latter I include Col. Gordon, who - I
cniiT ~K^^ returned to England after doingons derable Mischief instead of saving seve?alMillions a Year, for which purpose he was sent out.-
The Consummate Field Marshal
With Vitoria, Wellington had come full circle. From the
defense at Boxtel
,
the audacious assault at Assaye, the
stand at Torres Vedras, to the overwhelming of King Joseph,
the duke displayed absolute command of whatever battlefield
milieu in which he found himself. The only blemish on his
record related to sieges, and even there he can hardly be
called a loser.
Wellington came to Iberia as an offensive general,
comfortable in the belief that his Indian experiences would
easily transfer to the new theater of operations. He had
analyzed the French tactics and was certain he could defeat
them. Circumstances forced him to become a more cautious
general, a master of the defense. That experience, combined
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with the
.ixed success of the siege campaign, enabled hi. to
grow beyond the strictly offensive or defensive for^s of
generalship and become a field marshal in every sense of the
word. The duke once caln ht i„ is id, "i look upon Salamanca, Vitoria
and Waterloo as my best battles. ..... Audaciousness,
alacrity and risk went into all three of those actions. Not
coincidentally Salamanca and Vitoria occurred after his
siege campaign of 1812. The field marshal's education was
complete.
Many historians portray Waterloo as the centerpiece of
Wellington's career, it was certainly an event of great
significance in the course of European history, especially
since it finally pitted Wellington against Napoleon. Yet the
battle itself offered no new tactics or challenges. As the
duke himself said: "Napoleon did not maneuver at all. He
just moved forward in the old style and was driven off in
the old style. "'^
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